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.Millions of people may passionately wish that the Red-skins get to the Super Bowl and win the championship, but only the teamand its management and owners can accomplish this wished-for satisfac-tion.The management may tell the fans that they should support the teamand thus enter into the effort, but in fact what I do personally in thismatter is of almost no consequence at all.I might wear a red shirt to thegame, I might shout a lot, but my choices do not count for much inaccomplishing this goal; and yet I and millions like me may earnestly wishfor the outcome.The wishing is there.This second form of wishing vividly brings out the intersubjectivecharacter of human volition.I can strongly desire certain things that Iknow cannot be done by me but can be done by others.Even the first kindof wishing, the one directed toward impossibilities, has an intersubjectivedimension.There, I know that the thing I wish for is impossible foreveryone and not impossible only for me.If the intersubjective aspect werenot part of this first kind of wishing, if all the impossibles we wish forwere impossible only for me alone, then we would not be able to distin-guish the first kind of wishing from the second, since both wishables areimpossible for me individually.This is not the case, however; we know thatthere are some things that we eagerly wish for that we know can come topass, but we know with equal certainty that we ourselves cannot do themwhile others can.Sports are an obvious example of this sort of wishing, butpolitics is another, and there are many other kinds of desiring in all areasof life in which we are entirely dependent on others for their fulfillment.It is not the case that we first begin wishing and doing things that arepossible for us, and only subsequently attribute the same kind of wishingand execution to others.We could not start off in solitary action andchoice, no more than we could start off with a solitary language.Instead,we begin, as infants and children, with needs and wants and then wishesthat must be fulfilled by others, just as we start to use a language under theguidance of other people, who can speak before we can.The first needs,wants, and wishes that we have are satisfied by others and not by ourselves,and we must start off with dependency and trust.We gradually differen-tiate our agency from that of others: we absorb the possibility of taking ourown steps to fulfill our wishes by living with others who, at the beginning ofour lives, implement our wishes for us and then awaken our minds intopractical rationality.We learn the language of wish fulfillment from thoseon whom we depend.In the logic of wishing, deliberating, and choosing, 244 The Body and Human Actionwe are originally attached to others, and we must wean ourselves fromthem; wishing is not solipsistic at any point in its development.And lateron, all throughout our lives, much of what we wish for can only be done forus by other people.A particularly interesting question arises in cases when we ask others todeliberate and choose for us, when we entreat or persuade others to be theones who fulfill our wish.Do we subordinate them to our own deliberationand choice, so that we become the initiating agents, the actors, and theybecome merely one among many of the means that we have chosen? Dothey become our instruments? Or do we remain subject to these otherpersons, these other agents, and must we simply put our trust in them forthe fulfillment of our wish? Are they and they alone the effective agents? Iwould suggest that if we were to command, coerce, or force them to fulfillour wish, then we would indeed be the agents of the fulfillment, but if wewere simply to ask them to act on our behalf, we would not take over theagency.We would have a kind of initiating role in the action, but one thatrespects the irreducibility and rationality of other agents.How Wishes Become IntentionsWe move on to the third case, in which we wish for things that we ourselvescan bring about.As I have mentioned earlier, even in this case there issome distance between ourselves and what we wish for, because we cannotimmediately accomplish what we desire.If we could achieve it immediately,we would not need to wish for it; we would just do it.For example, if my earitches, I raise my hand and scratch it.There is no distinction betweenmeans and purposes in this performance.It is not normally the case that Ifirst wish to scratch my ear, then deliberate about how to attack thisproblem, and finally choose to raise my hand and scratch as a means toattain that purpose.The action is not that complicated.The logic of wish,deliberation, and choice does not come into play in such immediatesatisfactions.We are dealing here not with wishing, but with the moresimple wanting, and there is practically no distance between what I wantand what I do.There is practically no distance, but there is some distance, a very smallone.It is not the kind that functions between a wish and a choice; rather, itis the kind that is found in sensibility and perception, not in thinking.Myear itches, and it takes a moment for me to raise my hand and rub my ear,but this distance is merely sensory, the kind that occurs in perception,where we move around an object to see its various sides.Itching calls forscratching, and the scratching is done directly; the procedure is seamless.No thoughtful distinctions are called for, no breaking apart of the situa-tion into ends and means.There is no practical syntax.I don t have tothink between the itching and the rubbing.This kind of small-scale Forms of Wishing 245distance occurs on the level of sensibility, and it does not involve logicalarticulation.In the case of a full-scale wish, I have to begin thinking of things that aredifferent from what I wish for, and I have to begin thinking about alter-natives.I have to insert something between the purpose and myself.I haveto articulate parts and wholes much more explicitly [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.Millions of people may passionately wish that the Red-skins get to the Super Bowl and win the championship, but only the teamand its management and owners can accomplish this wished-for satisfac-tion.The management may tell the fans that they should support the teamand thus enter into the effort, but in fact what I do personally in thismatter is of almost no consequence at all.I might wear a red shirt to thegame, I might shout a lot, but my choices do not count for much inaccomplishing this goal; and yet I and millions like me may earnestly wishfor the outcome.The wishing is there.This second form of wishing vividly brings out the intersubjectivecharacter of human volition.I can strongly desire certain things that Iknow cannot be done by me but can be done by others.Even the first kindof wishing, the one directed toward impossibilities, has an intersubjectivedimension.There, I know that the thing I wish for is impossible foreveryone and not impossible only for me.If the intersubjective aspect werenot part of this first kind of wishing, if all the impossibles we wish forwere impossible only for me alone, then we would not be able to distin-guish the first kind of wishing from the second, since both wishables areimpossible for me individually.This is not the case, however; we know thatthere are some things that we eagerly wish for that we know can come topass, but we know with equal certainty that we ourselves cannot do themwhile others can.Sports are an obvious example of this sort of wishing, butpolitics is another, and there are many other kinds of desiring in all areasof life in which we are entirely dependent on others for their fulfillment.It is not the case that we first begin wishing and doing things that arepossible for us, and only subsequently attribute the same kind of wishingand execution to others.We could not start off in solitary action andchoice, no more than we could start off with a solitary language.Instead,we begin, as infants and children, with needs and wants and then wishesthat must be fulfilled by others, just as we start to use a language under theguidance of other people, who can speak before we can.The first needs,wants, and wishes that we have are satisfied by others and not by ourselves,and we must start off with dependency and trust.We gradually differen-tiate our agency from that of others: we absorb the possibility of taking ourown steps to fulfill our wishes by living with others who, at the beginning ofour lives, implement our wishes for us and then awaken our minds intopractical rationality.We learn the language of wish fulfillment from thoseon whom we depend.In the logic of wishing, deliberating, and choosing, 244 The Body and Human Actionwe are originally attached to others, and we must wean ourselves fromthem; wishing is not solipsistic at any point in its development.And lateron, all throughout our lives, much of what we wish for can only be done forus by other people.A particularly interesting question arises in cases when we ask others todeliberate and choose for us, when we entreat or persuade others to be theones who fulfill our wish.Do we subordinate them to our own deliberationand choice, so that we become the initiating agents, the actors, and theybecome merely one among many of the means that we have chosen? Dothey become our instruments? Or do we remain subject to these otherpersons, these other agents, and must we simply put our trust in them forthe fulfillment of our wish? Are they and they alone the effective agents? Iwould suggest that if we were to command, coerce, or force them to fulfillour wish, then we would indeed be the agents of the fulfillment, but if wewere simply to ask them to act on our behalf, we would not take over theagency.We would have a kind of initiating role in the action, but one thatrespects the irreducibility and rationality of other agents.How Wishes Become IntentionsWe move on to the third case, in which we wish for things that we ourselvescan bring about.As I have mentioned earlier, even in this case there issome distance between ourselves and what we wish for, because we cannotimmediately accomplish what we desire.If we could achieve it immediately,we would not need to wish for it; we would just do it.For example, if my earitches, I raise my hand and scratch it.There is no distinction betweenmeans and purposes in this performance.It is not normally the case that Ifirst wish to scratch my ear, then deliberate about how to attack thisproblem, and finally choose to raise my hand and scratch as a means toattain that purpose.The action is not that complicated.The logic of wish,deliberation, and choice does not come into play in such immediatesatisfactions.We are dealing here not with wishing, but with the moresimple wanting, and there is practically no distance between what I wantand what I do.There is practically no distance, but there is some distance, a very smallone.It is not the kind that functions between a wish and a choice; rather, itis the kind that is found in sensibility and perception, not in thinking.Myear itches, and it takes a moment for me to raise my hand and rub my ear,but this distance is merely sensory, the kind that occurs in perception,where we move around an object to see its various sides.Itching calls forscratching, and the scratching is done directly; the procedure is seamless.No thoughtful distinctions are called for, no breaking apart of the situa-tion into ends and means.There is no practical syntax.I don t have tothink between the itching and the rubbing.This kind of small-scale Forms of Wishing 245distance occurs on the level of sensibility, and it does not involve logicalarticulation.In the case of a full-scale wish, I have to begin thinking of things that aredifferent from what I wish for, and I have to begin thinking about alter-natives.I have to insert something between the purpose and myself.I haveto articulate parts and wholes much more explicitly [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]