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.It also suggests the conditions of finalityand publicity.In addition, it implies that the choice must be madein good faith.These considerations provide additional confirminggrounds for the two principles.The finality condition implies that the parties view their choiceas being made once and for all. (TJ, 176/153) Of course, this inno way precludes us from reconsidering the choice from the originalposition.The point is that parties in the original position are notallowed to gamble with the possibility of an unacceptable outcomewith the hope that they will be able to revisit the choice of principlesin the future.We stipulate that for an agreement to be valid, theparties must be able to honor it under all relevant and foreseeablecircumstances.There must be a rational assurance that one can carrythrough. (TJ, 175/153) As we have seen, the parties assume that theywill be capable of acting on the basis of a sense of justice.However,they also take into consideration the facts of moral psychology, andin particular the relative difficulty of motivating compliance witha conception.Rawls refers to this as the strains of commitment of a conception.It is sometimes mistakenly thought that this refersto the difficulty of effecting a transition from an existing society toone that would satisfy some conception of justice.If in an existingsociety some individuals profit from an unjust basic structure, it isvery possible that a transition to justice will require that they giveup their unjust gains.This may be psychologically (and politically)difficult, but does not tell against that conception of justice, at leastas part of ideal theory. Part i of A Theory of Justice Theory 71When the parties consider the strains of commitment of variousconceptions of justice, they do so from behind the veil.Because theymust choose a conception that they believe in good faith they willbe able to comply with, they will be especially concerned about thestrains of commitment on the least advantaged.The parties wouldnot accept principles that might result in the violation of their basicliberties if they had the option of selecting principles that wouldsecure them.Accepting utilitarianism would require that they bewilling to acquiesce in a loss of freedom over the course of theirlife for the sake of a greater good enjoyed by others. (TJ, 176/154)Such an agreement would be extremely difficult to keep. Indeed,we might wonder whether such an agreement can be made in goodfaith at all. (TJ, 176/154) But the parties have another option: theycan secure their basic liberties directly, as the first principle of justicedoes.It seems that they can make no other choice in good faith.Notice that although the difference principle would minimize thestrains of commitment of the least advantaged, this is not offeredas an argument for it.23 There is no requirement that the strains ofcommitment be minimized but only that they be limited so thatthere is a reasonable expectation of compliance.A related consideration concerns the stability of a conception ofjustice.While the strains of commitment concern the degree of psy-chological difficulty needed to comply with the principles, stabilityconcerns the tendency of a conception to generate its own supportover time.That is, a conception of justice is stable when individualsraised in and living in a society satisfying that conception tend todevelop and maintain a strong and effective sense of justice with thatcontent.Stability will be a major consideration in chapter 3, but herewe can observe one consideration that might weigh in favor of thegreater stability of the two principles over the stability of utilitarian-ism.The stability of a utilitarian conception of justice depends onthe willingness of individuals to make potentially unlimited sacrificesfor one another.This apparently requires that the members of a soci-ety form strong bonds of identification, even with those members23Presumably, although the strains of commitment of the mixed conception that we willconsider in chapter 2 are greater for the least advantaged, they are still within tolerable limitssince they provide a social minimum and secure everyone s basic needs.See also n.20, above. 72 Rawls s A Theory of Justicewith whom they have no personal contact or even direct knowledge.To the extent that such strong psychological identification is diffi-cult to achieve, utilitarianism will tend to be less stable.In contrast,the two principles appear to require only weaker identification sincethey define terms of mutual benefit relative to a baseline of equality.Nobody is asked to sacrifice relative to this baseline in order for othersto gain.To the extent that this is correct, and to the extent that theparties in the original position would be moved by considerationsof stability, this also would tell in favor of the two principles overutilitarianism.This argument is related to a third consideration.As we have seen,utilitarianism may require significant sacrifices over the course ofone s lifetime for the benefit of others.Especially in the absence ofstrong feelings of identification among individuals, this may tend toundermine the sense of self-respect among the least advantaged. Self-respect is not so much a part of any rational plan of life as the sensethat one s plan is worth carrying out [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.It also suggests the conditions of finalityand publicity.In addition, it implies that the choice must be madein good faith.These considerations provide additional confirminggrounds for the two principles.The finality condition implies that the parties view their choiceas being made once and for all. (TJ, 176/153) Of course, this inno way precludes us from reconsidering the choice from the originalposition.The point is that parties in the original position are notallowed to gamble with the possibility of an unacceptable outcomewith the hope that they will be able to revisit the choice of principlesin the future.We stipulate that for an agreement to be valid, theparties must be able to honor it under all relevant and foreseeablecircumstances.There must be a rational assurance that one can carrythrough. (TJ, 175/153) As we have seen, the parties assume that theywill be capable of acting on the basis of a sense of justice.However,they also take into consideration the facts of moral psychology, andin particular the relative difficulty of motivating compliance witha conception.Rawls refers to this as the strains of commitment of a conception.It is sometimes mistakenly thought that this refersto the difficulty of effecting a transition from an existing society toone that would satisfy some conception of justice.If in an existingsociety some individuals profit from an unjust basic structure, it isvery possible that a transition to justice will require that they giveup their unjust gains.This may be psychologically (and politically)difficult, but does not tell against that conception of justice, at leastas part of ideal theory. Part i of A Theory of Justice Theory 71When the parties consider the strains of commitment of variousconceptions of justice, they do so from behind the veil.Because theymust choose a conception that they believe in good faith they willbe able to comply with, they will be especially concerned about thestrains of commitment on the least advantaged.The parties wouldnot accept principles that might result in the violation of their basicliberties if they had the option of selecting principles that wouldsecure them.Accepting utilitarianism would require that they bewilling to acquiesce in a loss of freedom over the course of theirlife for the sake of a greater good enjoyed by others. (TJ, 176/154)Such an agreement would be extremely difficult to keep. Indeed,we might wonder whether such an agreement can be made in goodfaith at all. (TJ, 176/154) But the parties have another option: theycan secure their basic liberties directly, as the first principle of justicedoes.It seems that they can make no other choice in good faith.Notice that although the difference principle would minimize thestrains of commitment of the least advantaged, this is not offeredas an argument for it.23 There is no requirement that the strains ofcommitment be minimized but only that they be limited so thatthere is a reasonable expectation of compliance.A related consideration concerns the stability of a conception ofjustice.While the strains of commitment concern the degree of psy-chological difficulty needed to comply with the principles, stabilityconcerns the tendency of a conception to generate its own supportover time.That is, a conception of justice is stable when individualsraised in and living in a society satisfying that conception tend todevelop and maintain a strong and effective sense of justice with thatcontent.Stability will be a major consideration in chapter 3, but herewe can observe one consideration that might weigh in favor of thegreater stability of the two principles over the stability of utilitarian-ism.The stability of a utilitarian conception of justice depends onthe willingness of individuals to make potentially unlimited sacrificesfor one another.This apparently requires that the members of a soci-ety form strong bonds of identification, even with those members23Presumably, although the strains of commitment of the mixed conception that we willconsider in chapter 2 are greater for the least advantaged, they are still within tolerable limitssince they provide a social minimum and secure everyone s basic needs.See also n.20, above. 72 Rawls s A Theory of Justicewith whom they have no personal contact or even direct knowledge.To the extent that such strong psychological identification is diffi-cult to achieve, utilitarianism will tend to be less stable.In contrast,the two principles appear to require only weaker identification sincethey define terms of mutual benefit relative to a baseline of equality.Nobody is asked to sacrifice relative to this baseline in order for othersto gain.To the extent that this is correct, and to the extent that theparties in the original position would be moved by considerationsof stability, this also would tell in favor of the two principles overutilitarianism.This argument is related to a third consideration.As we have seen,utilitarianism may require significant sacrifices over the course ofone s lifetime for the benefit of others.Especially in the absence ofstrong feelings of identification among individuals, this may tend toundermine the sense of self-respect among the least advantaged. Self-respect is not so much a part of any rational plan of life as the sensethat one s plan is worth carrying out [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]