[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.As early as 1965 he hadwritten, with Karol Modzelewski, the path-breaking Open Letter tothe Party.This document, which still has an impressive powerwhen read today, was a Marxist critique of the Polish state.Similar in its social analysis to the theory of state capitalism, it Their democracy and ours 165insisted on revolutionary conclusions: it called for a return togenuine workers councils, for the arming of the workers andfor an anti-bureaucratic revolution.Indeed, it went on to callfor the organisation of workers circles, nuclei of the futureparty.49 However, by the time he played a leadership role inKOR and then Solidarity Kuron would abandon this revolu-tionary perspective.Paradoxically, the economic and social fate of the state capitalistregimes played an important part in Kuron s shift to the right.The economic success of Stalinism in the 1950s and 1960sallowed the opposition in Poland and throughout Eastern Europeto believe that a renewal of socialism, a return to the genuineMarxist tradition and to the democracy of the early RussianRevolution was necessary.Even those who broke completely withthe notion of reform Communism , as Kuron did, were influencedby evidence that state ownership was a viable economic model.The Open Letter had argued that the threat of armed Russianintervention would be met by the spread of the revolution tothe rest of the Eastern bloc.It could therefore paralyse the Rus-sian ruling classes ability to intervene.By 1980, however,Kuron was defending the reformist perspective precisely byreference to the Russian military threat.Just as the Western leftwas abandoning the revolutionary perspectives of 1968 infavour of the reformist perspective of the long march throughthe institutions , so Kuron was coming to believe in a self-limiting revolution in which the institutions of civil societywould be built up within the old order, gradually forcing it toaccommodate to liberal democratic norms.Kuron s change of heart was equally marked on the questionof party organisation.The Open Letter had been unambiguous onthis issue: In order that the working class can have the chance toplay the leading role, it must be conscious of its distinct,particular interests.It must express them in the form of apolitical programme and organise itself as a class fightingfor power into its own political party or parties. 50 166 Their democracy and oursBy the time KOR was founded Kuron and fellow activistAdam Michnik were writing a series of essays calling for a NewEvolutionism.KOR itself was renamed the Committee for SocialSelf-Defence.Although the central role of the working class wasnever abandoned, as it would have been difficult to do given thecombativity of Polish workers, this force was now to be har-nessed to a gradualist political strategy.New political allies wereto be sought, especially among the intellectuals gathered aroundthe Catholic Church.This new popular front reformism hadlittle need for the revolutionary organisation outlined in the OpenLetter.When, in the midst of the crisis which engulfed Solidarityin 1981, radicals began to call for the formation of such a partyKuron spoke against them.51 Such ideas were not peculiar toKuron but became the common coin of oppositions throughoutEastern Europe in the 1980s.The military coup of 1981 was a brutal refutation of thisperspective.Yet the reformist vision continued to be held by theleaders of Solidarity even as they were imprisoned and chasedinto the underground by Jaruzelski s troops.But if the 1981coup was a defeat for Solidarity, it was not a victory for theregime.The Polish ruling class were so burnt by the cost ofimposing martial law that it could not be repeated.MarianOrzechowski joined the Central Committee of the Polish CP in1981, its politbureau in 1983, and was effectively the Party slast foreign minister.He says, I personally feel that the 13 December 1981 had been ahugely negative experience for the army and the police.Ihad discussions with General Kiszczak and General Siwickithat martial law could only work once.The army and theriot police could not be mobilised against society.Most ofthe party leadership realised this.You couldn t rerunmartial law. 52The Russian ruling class had been unwilling to act, ironicallygiven Kuron s fears, and seemed to have drawn the conclusionthat it would henceforward not be possible to intervene against Their democracy and ours 167civil unrest in its Eastern empire.The Sinatra doctrine , I Did it MyWay , as Gorbachev s spokesman Gennady Gerasimov would latercall it, was sung to a Polish tune.General Jaruzelski himself recalls: Gorbachev on many occasions said that Polish changeswere an impulse to perestroika.He often requestedmaterials about what we had tried and tested.I wasclosely linked to Gorbachev.We spoke to one anotherwithout reserve, saying that old men like Zhivkov [ofBulgaria] and Honecker [of East Germany] did not under-stand a thing. 53And as the crisis sharpened again with the 1988 strikes, Gorba-chev had an immediate political motivation for continuing tosupport the Polish government s decision to attempt to hang onto power by compromising with, rather than cracking down on,Solidarity.Polish foreign minister Orzechowski again: When in February 1988 I told him [Gorbachev] that theposition of Jaruzelski was under attack, he was veryworried [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl trzylatki.xlx.pl
.As early as 1965 he hadwritten, with Karol Modzelewski, the path-breaking Open Letter tothe Party.This document, which still has an impressive powerwhen read today, was a Marxist critique of the Polish state.Similar in its social analysis to the theory of state capitalism, it Their democracy and ours 165insisted on revolutionary conclusions: it called for a return togenuine workers councils, for the arming of the workers andfor an anti-bureaucratic revolution.Indeed, it went on to callfor the organisation of workers circles, nuclei of the futureparty.49 However, by the time he played a leadership role inKOR and then Solidarity Kuron would abandon this revolu-tionary perspective.Paradoxically, the economic and social fate of the state capitalistregimes played an important part in Kuron s shift to the right.The economic success of Stalinism in the 1950s and 1960sallowed the opposition in Poland and throughout Eastern Europeto believe that a renewal of socialism, a return to the genuineMarxist tradition and to the democracy of the early RussianRevolution was necessary.Even those who broke completely withthe notion of reform Communism , as Kuron did, were influencedby evidence that state ownership was a viable economic model.The Open Letter had argued that the threat of armed Russianintervention would be met by the spread of the revolution tothe rest of the Eastern bloc.It could therefore paralyse the Rus-sian ruling classes ability to intervene.By 1980, however,Kuron was defending the reformist perspective precisely byreference to the Russian military threat.Just as the Western leftwas abandoning the revolutionary perspectives of 1968 infavour of the reformist perspective of the long march throughthe institutions , so Kuron was coming to believe in a self-limiting revolution in which the institutions of civil societywould be built up within the old order, gradually forcing it toaccommodate to liberal democratic norms.Kuron s change of heart was equally marked on the questionof party organisation.The Open Letter had been unambiguous onthis issue: In order that the working class can have the chance toplay the leading role, it must be conscious of its distinct,particular interests.It must express them in the form of apolitical programme and organise itself as a class fightingfor power into its own political party or parties. 50 166 Their democracy and oursBy the time KOR was founded Kuron and fellow activistAdam Michnik were writing a series of essays calling for a NewEvolutionism.KOR itself was renamed the Committee for SocialSelf-Defence.Although the central role of the working class wasnever abandoned, as it would have been difficult to do given thecombativity of Polish workers, this force was now to be har-nessed to a gradualist political strategy.New political allies wereto be sought, especially among the intellectuals gathered aroundthe Catholic Church.This new popular front reformism hadlittle need for the revolutionary organisation outlined in the OpenLetter.When, in the midst of the crisis which engulfed Solidarityin 1981, radicals began to call for the formation of such a partyKuron spoke against them.51 Such ideas were not peculiar toKuron but became the common coin of oppositions throughoutEastern Europe in the 1980s.The military coup of 1981 was a brutal refutation of thisperspective.Yet the reformist vision continued to be held by theleaders of Solidarity even as they were imprisoned and chasedinto the underground by Jaruzelski s troops.But if the 1981coup was a defeat for Solidarity, it was not a victory for theregime.The Polish ruling class were so burnt by the cost ofimposing martial law that it could not be repeated.MarianOrzechowski joined the Central Committee of the Polish CP in1981, its politbureau in 1983, and was effectively the Party slast foreign minister.He says, I personally feel that the 13 December 1981 had been ahugely negative experience for the army and the police.Ihad discussions with General Kiszczak and General Siwickithat martial law could only work once.The army and theriot police could not be mobilised against society.Most ofthe party leadership realised this.You couldn t rerunmartial law. 52The Russian ruling class had been unwilling to act, ironicallygiven Kuron s fears, and seemed to have drawn the conclusionthat it would henceforward not be possible to intervene against Their democracy and ours 167civil unrest in its Eastern empire.The Sinatra doctrine , I Did it MyWay , as Gorbachev s spokesman Gennady Gerasimov would latercall it, was sung to a Polish tune.General Jaruzelski himself recalls: Gorbachev on many occasions said that Polish changeswere an impulse to perestroika.He often requestedmaterials about what we had tried and tested.I wasclosely linked to Gorbachev.We spoke to one anotherwithout reserve, saying that old men like Zhivkov [ofBulgaria] and Honecker [of East Germany] did not under-stand a thing. 53And as the crisis sharpened again with the 1988 strikes, Gorba-chev had an immediate political motivation for continuing tosupport the Polish government s decision to attempt to hang onto power by compromising with, rather than cracking down on,Solidarity.Polish foreign minister Orzechowski again: When in February 1988 I told him [Gorbachev] that theposition of Jaruzelski was under attack, he was veryworried [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]