[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.The commander was replaced by his deputy, General JovanPetkovski, but the abrupt resignation heightened the impression thatMacedonian authorities were losing control of events. It s ratherunusual in western terms for a commander to wear his heart on hisfeet, a western military attaché commented.British Airways and most other foreign airlines, mindful of the NLAthreat to shell the airport at Skopje, abruptly cancelled their flights toMacedonia.I was virtually the only passenger on an Austrian Airlinesflight to Macedonia from Vienna.From a nearby seat, ChristianJennings of the Daily Telegraph pointed down at columns of smokebillowing from NLA positions at Aracinovo, which was under heavyMacedonian fire. 116 MACE DONI AThe jetliner landed uneventfully and the next day I set out from ahot and oppressively humid Skopje to tour the grim, poverty-strickensuburb of Stajkovci, adjoining Aracinovo.According to the localnewspaper, Vest, police had covertly distributed AK-47s to Stajkovciresidents to defend themselves.At least 200 Slavs had besieged the police station at Gazi Baba,marking the first time that Slav civilians from the capital had publiclyasked for weapons.Few of the people of Stajkovci wanted to talk toforeigners.Spy fever was beginning to sweep Skopje. The worrying thing now is that whoever you speak to, Albaniansor Macedonians, say that they are ready to take up arms, a Britishdiplomat said.Officially only reservists who had done national servicereceived Kalashnikovs.In practice, we learned, the police were for thefirst time arming civilians who were not reservists. An Outbreakof Peace?8The truth of the vanquished was quite differentfrom the truth of the victorious.Svetlana Velmar-Jankovic, DungeonAs the conflict worsened, western diplomats led by Javier Solana, theEuropean Union foreign policy chief, had sought to defuse theburgeoning civil war as early as April by sponsoring the creation of aGrand Coalition Government of National Unity, composed of bothdominant Macedonian Slav political parties and the two main ethnicAlbanian groupings.The coalition was eventually formed in May.Solana brought to bear his previous experience as Secretary-Generalof NATO, where he took over on the day that the alliance led 60,000troops from 30 nations into Bosnia to implement the Dayton peaceagreement.He sought to guide NATO through a transition from ColdWar thinking aimed mainly at protecting the West from a menacingSoviet Union to a more wide-ranging mission.Initially, the suave Spaniard with a salt and pepper beard haddisappointed some correspondents covering NATO. He specialises insoft talk, one said, for a long time I wouldn t go to his pressconferences.You would end up with nothing but nothing. However,sources in the alliance soon convinced reporters that Solana was anextremely able negotiator. People at NATO said that behind the scenesSolana was a good consensus seeker.He wouldn t take no for an answer,a good diplomat, one recalled.Western diplomats in Skopje concurred that Solana s dedication tothe peace process in Macedonia would turn out to be essential. Hewas kind of vital, said one.Solana s achievements in the Balkans, in 118 MACE DONI Acreating the Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003 out of the ashesof the old Yugoslavia, as well as in Macedonia, are cited by hissupporters as qualifying him to realise his ambition to become a futureEuropean prime minister under the new EU constitution.The peacemaking initiative reflected the extent to which foreigninfluence over the Macedonian state had remained extremely strongsince its inception.James Pettifer noted during President Gligorov sstewardship that there was always a small committee of EuropeanUnion and American ambassadors in Skopje, acting in a highlyinterventionist way over many policy and practical issues:As the FYROM government is wholly dependent on external fundsfrom these countries for survival, it is usually possible for Skopjepolicy to be manipulated in any direction the foreign ambassadorssee fit, including the reduction in Albanian influence over thegovernment wherever possible.The EU diplomatic community has a function in Skopje akin tothat of colonial governors in dependent territories, dispensers oflargesse from the mother country, in this case the EU and theinternational financial institutions, and guardians and defenders ofthe local law and order authority, in Macedonia the ex-communist-dominated Interior Ministry.1This theme was also explored by Tomlinson, the renegade SIS officer,in his book, The Big Breach.Tomlinson described the role of Britishand French officers in shoring up the Gligorov Government in theAlbanian arms plot that landed many home-grown ethnic Albanianradicals in prison cells in Skopje in November 1993, opening the wayfor more radical leaders with Kosovar connections to dominate theAlbanian spectrum.He implied that important planks of British Balkanpolicy were decided by secret and unaccountable elements in the statesystem, especially MI6 in alliance with the special forces in the military.By the end of May, however, the coalition was in deep disarray,after the Albanian party leaders reached a putative secret peace dealwith the NLA.The agreement was brokered mysteriously by the formerAmerican diplomat who had become a Balkan envoy for theOrganisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Robert Frowick.The affair caused President Trajkovski much disquiet, and he warnedthat unless ethnic Albanian politicians renounced the deal thegovernment would fall apart [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
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.The commander was replaced by his deputy, General JovanPetkovski, but the abrupt resignation heightened the impression thatMacedonian authorities were losing control of events. It s ratherunusual in western terms for a commander to wear his heart on hisfeet, a western military attaché commented.British Airways and most other foreign airlines, mindful of the NLAthreat to shell the airport at Skopje, abruptly cancelled their flights toMacedonia.I was virtually the only passenger on an Austrian Airlinesflight to Macedonia from Vienna.From a nearby seat, ChristianJennings of the Daily Telegraph pointed down at columns of smokebillowing from NLA positions at Aracinovo, which was under heavyMacedonian fire. 116 MACE DONI AThe jetliner landed uneventfully and the next day I set out from ahot and oppressively humid Skopje to tour the grim, poverty-strickensuburb of Stajkovci, adjoining Aracinovo.According to the localnewspaper, Vest, police had covertly distributed AK-47s to Stajkovciresidents to defend themselves.At least 200 Slavs had besieged the police station at Gazi Baba,marking the first time that Slav civilians from the capital had publiclyasked for weapons.Few of the people of Stajkovci wanted to talk toforeigners.Spy fever was beginning to sweep Skopje. The worrying thing now is that whoever you speak to, Albaniansor Macedonians, say that they are ready to take up arms, a Britishdiplomat said.Officially only reservists who had done national servicereceived Kalashnikovs.In practice, we learned, the police were for thefirst time arming civilians who were not reservists. An Outbreakof Peace?8The truth of the vanquished was quite differentfrom the truth of the victorious.Svetlana Velmar-Jankovic, DungeonAs the conflict worsened, western diplomats led by Javier Solana, theEuropean Union foreign policy chief, had sought to defuse theburgeoning civil war as early as April by sponsoring the creation of aGrand Coalition Government of National Unity, composed of bothdominant Macedonian Slav political parties and the two main ethnicAlbanian groupings.The coalition was eventually formed in May.Solana brought to bear his previous experience as Secretary-Generalof NATO, where he took over on the day that the alliance led 60,000troops from 30 nations into Bosnia to implement the Dayton peaceagreement.He sought to guide NATO through a transition from ColdWar thinking aimed mainly at protecting the West from a menacingSoviet Union to a more wide-ranging mission.Initially, the suave Spaniard with a salt and pepper beard haddisappointed some correspondents covering NATO. He specialises insoft talk, one said, for a long time I wouldn t go to his pressconferences.You would end up with nothing but nothing. However,sources in the alliance soon convinced reporters that Solana was anextremely able negotiator. People at NATO said that behind the scenesSolana was a good consensus seeker.He wouldn t take no for an answer,a good diplomat, one recalled.Western diplomats in Skopje concurred that Solana s dedication tothe peace process in Macedonia would turn out to be essential. Hewas kind of vital, said one.Solana s achievements in the Balkans, in 118 MACE DONI Acreating the Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003 out of the ashesof the old Yugoslavia, as well as in Macedonia, are cited by hissupporters as qualifying him to realise his ambition to become a futureEuropean prime minister under the new EU constitution.The peacemaking initiative reflected the extent to which foreigninfluence over the Macedonian state had remained extremely strongsince its inception.James Pettifer noted during President Gligorov sstewardship that there was always a small committee of EuropeanUnion and American ambassadors in Skopje, acting in a highlyinterventionist way over many policy and practical issues:As the FYROM government is wholly dependent on external fundsfrom these countries for survival, it is usually possible for Skopjepolicy to be manipulated in any direction the foreign ambassadorssee fit, including the reduction in Albanian influence over thegovernment wherever possible.The EU diplomatic community has a function in Skopje akin tothat of colonial governors in dependent territories, dispensers oflargesse from the mother country, in this case the EU and theinternational financial institutions, and guardians and defenders ofthe local law and order authority, in Macedonia the ex-communist-dominated Interior Ministry.1This theme was also explored by Tomlinson, the renegade SIS officer,in his book, The Big Breach.Tomlinson described the role of Britishand French officers in shoring up the Gligorov Government in theAlbanian arms plot that landed many home-grown ethnic Albanianradicals in prison cells in Skopje in November 1993, opening the wayfor more radical leaders with Kosovar connections to dominate theAlbanian spectrum.He implied that important planks of British Balkanpolicy were decided by secret and unaccountable elements in the statesystem, especially MI6 in alliance with the special forces in the military.By the end of May, however, the coalition was in deep disarray,after the Albanian party leaders reached a putative secret peace dealwith the NLA.The agreement was brokered mysteriously by the formerAmerican diplomat who had become a Balkan envoy for theOrganisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Robert Frowick.The affair caused President Trajkovski much disquiet, and he warnedthat unless ethnic Albanian politicians renounced the deal thegovernment would fall apart [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]