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. 3118 Ch-01.qxd 11/13/03 9:32 AM Page 2020 Contemporary Political Theory.[o]ur question is: viewing society as a fair system of cooperationbetween citizens regarded as free and equal, what principles of justice aremost appropriate to specify basic rights and liberties, and to regulate socialand economic inequalities in citizens prospects over a complete life? Theseinequalities are our primary concern.To find a principle to regulate these inequalities, we look to our firmestconsidered convictions about equal basic rights and liberties, the fair valueof the political liberties as well as fair equality of opportunity.We look out-side the sphere of distributive justice more narrowly construed to seewhether an appropriate distributive principle is singled out by those firmestconvictions once their essential elements are represented in the original posi-tion as a devise of representation (§6).This device is to assist us in workingout which principle, or principles, the representatives of free and equal citi-zens would select to regulate social and economic inequalities in theseprospects over a complete life when they assume that the equal basic liber-ties and fair opportunities are already secured.The idea here is to use our firmest considered convictions about the natureof a democratic society as a fair system of cooperation between free andequal citizens as modeled in the original position to see whether thecombined assertion of those convictions so expressed will help us to identifyan appropriate distributive principle for the basic structure with its eco-nomic and social inequalities in citizens life-prospects.Our convictionsabout principles regulating those inequalities are much less firm andassured; so we look to our firmest convictions for guidance where assuranceis lacking and guidance is needed (Theory, §§4, 20).Notes1 The exposition of justice as fairness starts with these familiar ideas.In this way weconnect it with the common sense of everyday life.But because the expositionbegins with these ideas does not mean that the argument for justice as fairnesssimply assumes them as a basis.Everything depends on how the expositionworks out as a whole and whether the ideas and principles of this conception ofjustice, as well as its conclusions, prove acceptable on due reflection.See §10.2 This kind of distinction between the reasonable and the rational was made byW.M.Sibley in The Rational versus the Reasonable, Philosophical Review 62(October 1953): 554 560.The text connects the distinction closely with the idea ofcooperation among equals and specifies it accordingly for this more definite idea.From time to time we come back to the distinction between the reasonable and therational.See §23.2 and §23.3.It is of central importance in understanding thestructure of justice as fairness, as well as T.M.Scanlon s general contractualistmoral theory.See his Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in Utilitarianism andBeyond, ed.Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1982).3 This section summarizes some points from The Basic Liberties and TheirPriority, Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol.3, ed.Sterling McMurrin (Salt LakeCity: University of Utah Press, 1982), §I, reprinted in Political Liberalism.In that 3118 Ch-01.qxd 11/13/03 9:32 AM Page 21Justice as Fairness 21essay I try to reply to what I believe are two of the more serious objections tomy account of liberty in Theory raised by H.L.A.Hart in his splendid criticalreview essay, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, University of Chicago LawReview 40 (Spring 1973): 551 555, reprinted in his Essays in Jurisprudence andPhilosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).No changes made in justiceas fairness in this restatement are more significant than those forced by Hart sreview.4 Some have found this kind of restriction objectionable; they think a politicalconception should be framed to cover all logically possible cases, or all con-ceivable cases, and not restricted to cases that can arise only within a specifiedinstitutional context.See for example Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p.112.In contrast, we seek a principleto govern social and economic inequalities in democratic regimes as we knowthem, and so we are concerned with inequalities in citizens life-prospects thatmay actually arise, given our understanding of how certain institutions work.5 I say so-called welfare state because Part IV distinguishes between aproperty-owning democracy and a capitalist welfare state and maintains thatthe latter conflicts with justice as fairness.6 This seems obvious in most cases.Clearly the two principles of justice (§13)with their political liberties are not supposed to regulate the internal organi-zation of churches and universities.Nor is the difference principle to governhow parents are to treat their children or to allocate the family s wealth amongthem.See Part IV, §50, on the family.7 This order I assume to be viewed as objective as in some form of moral realism.8 [See Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993),pp.24 25.]9 This is an essential feature of justice as fairness as a form of the contract doc-trine.It differs from Locke s view in this respect, and also from the contractviews of Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books,1974), of James Buchanan in The Limits of Liberty (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1975), and of David Gauthier in Morals by Agreement (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1986) [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
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. 3118 Ch-01.qxd 11/13/03 9:32 AM Page 2020 Contemporary Political Theory.[o]ur question is: viewing society as a fair system of cooperationbetween citizens regarded as free and equal, what principles of justice aremost appropriate to specify basic rights and liberties, and to regulate socialand economic inequalities in citizens prospects over a complete life? Theseinequalities are our primary concern.To find a principle to regulate these inequalities, we look to our firmestconsidered convictions about equal basic rights and liberties, the fair valueof the political liberties as well as fair equality of opportunity.We look out-side the sphere of distributive justice more narrowly construed to seewhether an appropriate distributive principle is singled out by those firmestconvictions once their essential elements are represented in the original posi-tion as a devise of representation (§6).This device is to assist us in workingout which principle, or principles, the representatives of free and equal citi-zens would select to regulate social and economic inequalities in theseprospects over a complete life when they assume that the equal basic liber-ties and fair opportunities are already secured.The idea here is to use our firmest considered convictions about the natureof a democratic society as a fair system of cooperation between free andequal citizens as modeled in the original position to see whether thecombined assertion of those convictions so expressed will help us to identifyan appropriate distributive principle for the basic structure with its eco-nomic and social inequalities in citizens life-prospects.Our convictionsabout principles regulating those inequalities are much less firm andassured; so we look to our firmest convictions for guidance where assuranceis lacking and guidance is needed (Theory, §§4, 20).Notes1 The exposition of justice as fairness starts with these familiar ideas.In this way weconnect it with the common sense of everyday life.But because the expositionbegins with these ideas does not mean that the argument for justice as fairnesssimply assumes them as a basis.Everything depends on how the expositionworks out as a whole and whether the ideas and principles of this conception ofjustice, as well as its conclusions, prove acceptable on due reflection.See §10.2 This kind of distinction between the reasonable and the rational was made byW.M.Sibley in The Rational versus the Reasonable, Philosophical Review 62(October 1953): 554 560.The text connects the distinction closely with the idea ofcooperation among equals and specifies it accordingly for this more definite idea.From time to time we come back to the distinction between the reasonable and therational.See §23.2 and §23.3.It is of central importance in understanding thestructure of justice as fairness, as well as T.M.Scanlon s general contractualistmoral theory.See his Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in Utilitarianism andBeyond, ed.Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1982).3 This section summarizes some points from The Basic Liberties and TheirPriority, Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol.3, ed.Sterling McMurrin (Salt LakeCity: University of Utah Press, 1982), §I, reprinted in Political Liberalism.In that 3118 Ch-01.qxd 11/13/03 9:32 AM Page 21Justice as Fairness 21essay I try to reply to what I believe are two of the more serious objections tomy account of liberty in Theory raised by H.L.A.Hart in his splendid criticalreview essay, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, University of Chicago LawReview 40 (Spring 1973): 551 555, reprinted in his Essays in Jurisprudence andPhilosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).No changes made in justiceas fairness in this restatement are more significant than those forced by Hart sreview.4 Some have found this kind of restriction objectionable; they think a politicalconception should be framed to cover all logically possible cases, or all con-ceivable cases, and not restricted to cases that can arise only within a specifiedinstitutional context.See for example Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p.112.In contrast, we seek a principleto govern social and economic inequalities in democratic regimes as we knowthem, and so we are concerned with inequalities in citizens life-prospects thatmay actually arise, given our understanding of how certain institutions work.5 I say so-called welfare state because Part IV distinguishes between aproperty-owning democracy and a capitalist welfare state and maintains thatthe latter conflicts with justice as fairness.6 This seems obvious in most cases.Clearly the two principles of justice (§13)with their political liberties are not supposed to regulate the internal organi-zation of churches and universities.Nor is the difference principle to governhow parents are to treat their children or to allocate the family s wealth amongthem.See Part IV, §50, on the family.7 This order I assume to be viewed as objective as in some form of moral realism.8 [See Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993),pp.24 25.]9 This is an essential feature of justice as fairness as a form of the contract doc-trine.It differs from Locke s view in this respect, and also from the contractviews of Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books,1974), of James Buchanan in The Limits of Liberty (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1975), and of David Gauthier in Morals by Agreement (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1986) [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]