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.So here, judging from the empirical standpoint, ought would notimply can. The empirical standpoint situates every human being s actions within achain of natural causes over which he has no control (cf., ibid., 82/5:97).But, writes Kant, if we were capable of another view, namely an intel-lectual intuition of the same subject.then we would become aware thatthis whole chain of appearances, with respect to all that the moral law isconcerned with, depends upon the spontaneity of the subject as a thing initself (83/5:99).So there is one view on human actions which sees themall as predictable events that could not have been otherwise, given thecharacter of the human agent and the external occasion of his action.Butthere is another, intelligible view on the human subject as a thing in itself, aview we can only imagine taking, because we cannot view what underliesits series of appearances.From this standpoint, if we could adopt it, wecould see how the unified phenomenon of a sensible life could have beenotherwise, and hence how any action-event in its chain of appearancescould have been otherwise. [T]he moral law assures us of this differencebetween the relation of our actions as appearances to the sensible being ofour subject and the relation by which this sensible being is itself referredto the intelligible substratum in us (ibid.).Because of the moral law, thatis, we cannot avoid thinking that whatever we ought to do, we can do.But in thinking this we adopt a non-empirical, intelligible view of ourconduct.³³ Kant said as much in the following comment, which he framed in terms of commission ratherthan omission: If I say of a human being who commits a theft that this deed is, in accordance withthe natural law of causality, a necessary result of determining grounds in preceding time, then it wasimpossible that it could have been left undone. (Practical Reason, 80/5:95). character from two standpoints 159The next sentence Kant wrote was: From this [intelligible] perspective,which is natural to our reason though inexplicable, appraisals can be justifiedwhich, though made in all conscientiousness, yet seem at first glance [i.e.,from the empirical perspective] contrary to all equity. He has explainedhere how justified moral appraisals from the intelligible perspective, whichis where ought does imply can , may seem contrary to all equity from the empirical perspective, where ought does not imply can .If wesay that the agent who recognized that he ought, morally, to do somethingcould not have done it nevertheless, because his opposing inclinations weretoo strong, then we are considering the case from the empirical perspective.But this is not how we see things from the intelligible perspective presupposed by the moral law.When we say from this perspective that sincehe ought to have done it, he could have, we mean that the unitaryphenomenon of his character ought to have, and so could have, providedfor his doing it.But if Kant s moral theory tells us that we ought to be better thanwe have been, doesn t this mean that we ought to, and so that wecan, alter the moral character of the role we play in the phenomenalworld? Wood once responded to such a question in the following way: Presumably, [Kant s] theory is that for every imaginable course of conductin the phenomenal world, there is a timeless choice.that would yieldthat course of conduct.Hence there are some such choices whose resultsin the world of appearance involve changes in empirical character. ( Kant s Compatibilism, 94).We must be careful here, however, to avoidthinking that moral dissatisfaction with the way things are unfolding intime might lead a noumenal person to alter the phenomenal person sempirical character.Personal moral progress in Kant s theory would implya change of character from bad to better.But this can be consistent withthe idea that empirical character is the temporally developing appearanceof a timeless, invariant, noumenal action.We need only stop to considerthe perplexities to be encountered in the very idea of character.Consider aphysical analogy.A cup of water dropped from a height of one meter willsplash.A cup of ice dropped in the same way will bounce.Here, apparently,are two physical objects whose actions differ in the same circumstances justbecause of their different empirical characters.But the cup of water canundergo a change of physical character at 0æ%C and take on the character ofice; and we know that water s changing to ice at that temperature is, so to 160 character from two standpointsspeak, in character. So does the water s change from being somethingwhose character calls for it to splash when dropped, to something whosecharacter calls for it to bounce, constitute a change of character or not? Inone sense of character, yes; in another sense, no.The same equivocation applies in human psychology, though in a waythat is more complicated.What must always be factored in here, unlikein the physical world, is that the human being s representation of thelaws of her character can subsequently make a difference in her character.Self-consciousness alters the conscious self.³t So if someone should cometo recognize the moral shortcomings of his character, that recognition itselfmay change his character.And whether it changes his character for thebetter or the worse must depend, of course, on his character, on the kindof person he is at that time.But here the charge of fatalism arises most pointedly.From theintelligible perspective on character moral progress is inconceivable, fornoumenal becoming is a contradiction.Yet from the empirical perspective,even though change and becoming takes place here, we cannot control itwhile we are in the stream of becoming [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
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.So here, judging from the empirical standpoint, ought would notimply can. The empirical standpoint situates every human being s actions within achain of natural causes over which he has no control (cf., ibid., 82/5:97).But, writes Kant, if we were capable of another view, namely an intel-lectual intuition of the same subject.then we would become aware thatthis whole chain of appearances, with respect to all that the moral law isconcerned with, depends upon the spontaneity of the subject as a thing initself (83/5:99).So there is one view on human actions which sees themall as predictable events that could not have been otherwise, given thecharacter of the human agent and the external occasion of his action.Butthere is another, intelligible view on the human subject as a thing in itself, aview we can only imagine taking, because we cannot view what underliesits series of appearances.From this standpoint, if we could adopt it, wecould see how the unified phenomenon of a sensible life could have beenotherwise, and hence how any action-event in its chain of appearancescould have been otherwise. [T]he moral law assures us of this differencebetween the relation of our actions as appearances to the sensible being ofour subject and the relation by which this sensible being is itself referredto the intelligible substratum in us (ibid.).Because of the moral law, thatis, we cannot avoid thinking that whatever we ought to do, we can do.But in thinking this we adopt a non-empirical, intelligible view of ourconduct.³³ Kant said as much in the following comment, which he framed in terms of commission ratherthan omission: If I say of a human being who commits a theft that this deed is, in accordance withthe natural law of causality, a necessary result of determining grounds in preceding time, then it wasimpossible that it could have been left undone. (Practical Reason, 80/5:95). character from two standpoints 159The next sentence Kant wrote was: From this [intelligible] perspective,which is natural to our reason though inexplicable, appraisals can be justifiedwhich, though made in all conscientiousness, yet seem at first glance [i.e.,from the empirical perspective] contrary to all equity. He has explainedhere how justified moral appraisals from the intelligible perspective, whichis where ought does imply can , may seem contrary to all equity from the empirical perspective, where ought does not imply can .If wesay that the agent who recognized that he ought, morally, to do somethingcould not have done it nevertheless, because his opposing inclinations weretoo strong, then we are considering the case from the empirical perspective.But this is not how we see things from the intelligible perspective presupposed by the moral law.When we say from this perspective that sincehe ought to have done it, he could have, we mean that the unitaryphenomenon of his character ought to have, and so could have, providedfor his doing it.But if Kant s moral theory tells us that we ought to be better thanwe have been, doesn t this mean that we ought to, and so that wecan, alter the moral character of the role we play in the phenomenalworld? Wood once responded to such a question in the following way: Presumably, [Kant s] theory is that for every imaginable course of conductin the phenomenal world, there is a timeless choice.that would yieldthat course of conduct.Hence there are some such choices whose resultsin the world of appearance involve changes in empirical character. ( Kant s Compatibilism, 94).We must be careful here, however, to avoidthinking that moral dissatisfaction with the way things are unfolding intime might lead a noumenal person to alter the phenomenal person sempirical character.Personal moral progress in Kant s theory would implya change of character from bad to better.But this can be consistent withthe idea that empirical character is the temporally developing appearanceof a timeless, invariant, noumenal action.We need only stop to considerthe perplexities to be encountered in the very idea of character.Consider aphysical analogy.A cup of water dropped from a height of one meter willsplash.A cup of ice dropped in the same way will bounce.Here, apparently,are two physical objects whose actions differ in the same circumstances justbecause of their different empirical characters.But the cup of water canundergo a change of physical character at 0æ%C and take on the character ofice; and we know that water s changing to ice at that temperature is, so to 160 character from two standpointsspeak, in character. So does the water s change from being somethingwhose character calls for it to splash when dropped, to something whosecharacter calls for it to bounce, constitute a change of character or not? Inone sense of character, yes; in another sense, no.The same equivocation applies in human psychology, though in a waythat is more complicated.What must always be factored in here, unlikein the physical world, is that the human being s representation of thelaws of her character can subsequently make a difference in her character.Self-consciousness alters the conscious self.³t So if someone should cometo recognize the moral shortcomings of his character, that recognition itselfmay change his character.And whether it changes his character for thebetter or the worse must depend, of course, on his character, on the kindof person he is at that time.But here the charge of fatalism arises most pointedly.From theintelligible perspective on character moral progress is inconceivable, fornoumenal becoming is a contradiction.Yet from the empirical perspective,even though change and becoming takes place here, we cannot control itwhile we are in the stream of becoming [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]