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.It is almost certain that Britain and Franceare working in collusion with the Israelis. 84On that same day, Anglo-French forces began air attack on Egyptian air-fields.British paratroopers landed and occupied the canal on November 5.85On November 6, Macmillan, then chairman of the Exchequer, informed theBritish cabinet that a run on the pound had been orchestrated by Wash-ington, causing the pound to lose one-eighth of its value.Macmillan was theninformed by the Eisenhower administration that the United States wouldsupport an IMF loan to prop up the pound if a cease-fire was signed bymidnight.86 The cease-fire was signed, the conflict ended, and the Anglo-French forces withdrew from the canal area.However, even later, Eden Preventing What? 39publicly claimed that there was not foreknowledge that Israel would attackEgypt. 87SELF-IMAGELord Bolingbroke, an eighteenth-century scholar, wrote:The precise point at which the scales of power turn.is imperceptibleto common observation: and, in one case as in the other, some progressmust be made in the new direction, before the change is per-ceived.they who are in the sinking scale do not easily come off fromthe habitual prejudices of superior wealth, or power, or skill, or courage,nor from the confidences that the prejudices inspire.They who are in therising scale do not immediately feel their strength, nor assume thatconfidence in it which successful experience gives them afterwards.They who are the most concerned to watch the variations of this bal-ance, misjudge often in the same manner, and from the same prejudices.They continue to dread a power no longer able to hurt them, or theycontinue to have no apprehension of a power that grows daily moreformidable.88Along the same lines, John Stoessinger wrote that most national leaderswill not examine their prejudices and stereotypes until they are shaken andshattered into doing so.People, in short, learn and grow largely throughsuffering. 89Much has been written about how accurately leaders are able to perceivethe actual balance of power.However, though much has been written of theformation of our perception of others, there has been too little attention paidto the formation of a state s self-image.However, it is precisely this issue thatis at the heart of this case.Hans Morgenthau, in his work on realism, relieson a calculative model.The essence of this model is that national power can be calculated by adding together such factors as geography, population,armed forces, and some slightly more ambiguous variables, such as nationalcharacter.90However, though these factors are undoubtedly important componentsof national power, is there any real way to make such a calculation? Thiscase illustrates that these power calculations are not made as easily as Mor-genthau assumes.If, for instance, Eden had calculated ahead of time theinfluence that the United States had on Britain (and the true wishes of theU.S.), he might have been more willing to seek a diplomatic solution.Thesefactors of national power, all easy enough to calculate on their own, arealmost impossible to add together.Indeed, Morgenthau concedes that a true 40 Why Leaders Choose Warevaluation of power is an ideal task, and hence, incapable of achieve-ment. 91CONCLUSIONBritish initiation of a preventive war, in this case, is based on two centralissues.First, the psychological perceptions of British leaders caused them tosee in Nasser an enemy similar to Hitler or Mussolini.The analogies thatBritish leaders used to categorize Nasser also prescribed a specific solution:aggression must be met with force.The effect of the Munich analogy, sooften invoked by other leaders, must have had particular resonance for Eden,who had been so intimately involved in the decision to appease Hitler.Infact, Eden declared himself to be haunted by the mistakes committed indealing with Hitler.92 The second cause of British action was their belief thattheir position in the world allowed them to act unilaterally.British leadersbelieved that Britain was powerful enough to act in defiance of internationallaw (and American wishes).However, these factors were necessary, but not sufficient [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.It is almost certain that Britain and Franceare working in collusion with the Israelis. 84On that same day, Anglo-French forces began air attack on Egyptian air-fields.British paratroopers landed and occupied the canal on November 5.85On November 6, Macmillan, then chairman of the Exchequer, informed theBritish cabinet that a run on the pound had been orchestrated by Wash-ington, causing the pound to lose one-eighth of its value.Macmillan was theninformed by the Eisenhower administration that the United States wouldsupport an IMF loan to prop up the pound if a cease-fire was signed bymidnight.86 The cease-fire was signed, the conflict ended, and the Anglo-French forces withdrew from the canal area.However, even later, Eden Preventing What? 39publicly claimed that there was not foreknowledge that Israel would attackEgypt. 87SELF-IMAGELord Bolingbroke, an eighteenth-century scholar, wrote:The precise point at which the scales of power turn.is imperceptibleto common observation: and, in one case as in the other, some progressmust be made in the new direction, before the change is per-ceived.they who are in the sinking scale do not easily come off fromthe habitual prejudices of superior wealth, or power, or skill, or courage,nor from the confidences that the prejudices inspire.They who are in therising scale do not immediately feel their strength, nor assume thatconfidence in it which successful experience gives them afterwards.They who are the most concerned to watch the variations of this bal-ance, misjudge often in the same manner, and from the same prejudices.They continue to dread a power no longer able to hurt them, or theycontinue to have no apprehension of a power that grows daily moreformidable.88Along the same lines, John Stoessinger wrote that most national leaderswill not examine their prejudices and stereotypes until they are shaken andshattered into doing so.People, in short, learn and grow largely throughsuffering. 89Much has been written about how accurately leaders are able to perceivethe actual balance of power.However, though much has been written of theformation of our perception of others, there has been too little attention paidto the formation of a state s self-image.However, it is precisely this issue thatis at the heart of this case.Hans Morgenthau, in his work on realism, relieson a calculative model.The essence of this model is that national power can be calculated by adding together such factors as geography, population,armed forces, and some slightly more ambiguous variables, such as nationalcharacter.90However, though these factors are undoubtedly important componentsof national power, is there any real way to make such a calculation? Thiscase illustrates that these power calculations are not made as easily as Mor-genthau assumes.If, for instance, Eden had calculated ahead of time theinfluence that the United States had on Britain (and the true wishes of theU.S.), he might have been more willing to seek a diplomatic solution.Thesefactors of national power, all easy enough to calculate on their own, arealmost impossible to add together.Indeed, Morgenthau concedes that a true 40 Why Leaders Choose Warevaluation of power is an ideal task, and hence, incapable of achieve-ment. 91CONCLUSIONBritish initiation of a preventive war, in this case, is based on two centralissues.First, the psychological perceptions of British leaders caused them tosee in Nasser an enemy similar to Hitler or Mussolini.The analogies thatBritish leaders used to categorize Nasser also prescribed a specific solution:aggression must be met with force.The effect of the Munich analogy, sooften invoked by other leaders, must have had particular resonance for Eden,who had been so intimately involved in the decision to appease Hitler.Infact, Eden declared himself to be haunted by the mistakes committed indealing with Hitler.92 The second cause of British action was their belief thattheir position in the world allowed them to act unilaterally.British leadersbelieved that Britain was powerful enough to act in defiance of internationallaw (and American wishes).However, these factors were necessary, but not sufficient [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]