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.Where they disagree, of course, is on whatthat structure is.For Aquinas all inclinations or appetites are end-governedand for Spinoza no motive tendency or appetite is.We can get something of the flavor of Spinoza s approach from a well-known discussion of freedom.After discussing God s freedom, Spinozawrites:Let us, however, descend to created things, which are all determined by exter-nal causes to exist,and to act in a definite and determined manner.In order thatthis may be clearly understood,let us think of a very simple thing.For instance,a stone receives from an external cause, which impels it, a certain quantity ofmotion, with which it will afterwards necessarily continue to move when theimpact of the external cause has ceased.This continuance of the stone in itsmotion is compelled,not because it is necessary,but because it must be definedby the impact of an external cause.32 (G iv.266;The Letters,295)After making this point about the stone, Spinoza next notes that thesame holds good of more complex systems:What is here said of a stone must be understood of each individual thing,how-ever composite and however adapted to various ends it may be thought to be(quantumvis illa composita, & ad plurima apta esse concipiatur): that is, each thing isnecessarily determined by an external cause to exist and act in a definite anddeterminate manner.(G iv.266;Correspondence,295)Then,finally,he considers the difference that cognition makes to this:Next,conceive,if you please,that the stone while it continues in motion thinks,and knows that it is striving as much as possible to continue in motion.Surelythis stone,inasmuch as it is conscious only of its own effort,and is far from indif-ferent,will believe that it is completely free,and that it continues in motion forno other reason than because it wants to.And such is the human freedom whichall men boast that they possess, and which consists solely in this, that men areconscious of their appetite (appetitus),and ignorant of the causes by which theyare determined.(G iv.266;Correspondence,295*)32The translation is taken from A.Wolf, The Correspondence of Spinoza [Correspondence](London:George Allen & Unwin,1928). 04-Garber-v2-chap04.qxd 8/4/05 11:34 AM Page 136136 John CarrieroSpinoza is suggesting here that (a) there is no significant differencebetween the rock s acquisition of a motive tendency and a complex sys-tem s acquisition of a motive tendency (all are set by external causes andremain until an external new cause comes along),and (b) human motivetendencies (here, appetite (appetitus) ) work in the same way.To judgefrom this passage,the only difference between us and the cognitive stoneis that the motive tendencies of which we are aware are more complex(namely, those associated with a system of matter that counts as thehuman body),not a difference in how we acquire motive tendencies orin their internal structure (viz., in whether or not they are internallyend-directed).The passage we have just considered is about freedom, and it is con-ceivable that Spinoza does think that human motive tendencies aresomehow acquired differently or somehow structured differently, butthat this is irrelevant to the point he wished to make there.To get a fullerpicture of his thought,let s look at his comments about appetite,desire,ends,final causes,and the perceived good in the Ethics.In EIIIP9S, after introducing his conatus doctrine, Spinoza offers aseries of definitions based on the idea of conatus.Although I think thatSpinoza holds that the defined terminology can be applied very gener-ally, I think he also holds that the terminology is especially associatedwith human activity:Schol.:When this striving is related only to the Mind, it is called Will;33 butwhen it is related to the Mind and Body together, it is called Appetite.ThisAppetite,therefore,is nothing but the very essence of man,from whose naturethere necessarily follow those things that promote his preservation.And so manis determined to do those things.Between appetite and desire there is no difference,except that desire is gen-erally related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetites (quatenus suiappetitus sunt conscii).So desire can be defined as appetite together with consciousness(conscientia) of the appetite.(G ii.147 8;C i.500)Notice, to begin with, that there is a single motive tendency, this striv-ing , that is found in both the human body and the human mind.This33On Spinoza s account of will the will is not characterized through its object,the good,as it was for the Aristotelians.In fact,on Spinoza s telling,there is not really a faculty of will atall there is just the joint product of the striving of all the constituent ideas of the mind.Thisbreaking of the will into pieces was adumbrated first in EIIP48. 04-Garber-v2-chap04.qxd 8/4/05 11:34 AM Page 137Spinoza on Final Causality 137was a point that Spinoza had emphasized earlier in Part 3,in EIIIP2S:All these things,indeed,show clearly that both the decision of the Mind and theappetite and the determination of the Body by nature exist together or ratherare one and the same thing, which we call a decision when it is consideredunder, and explained through, the attribute of Thought, and which we call adetermination when it is considered under the attribute of Extension anddeduced from the laws of motion and rest.(G ii.144;C i.497)The most obvious way to take these remarks is that there is a single basicstructure that can be related to body, mind, or both together.In partic-ular,if the motive tendencies connected with the human body are blind,that is, if they are not end-governed, then it is difficult to understandhow the same thing when considered under, and explained through,the attribute of Thought could be end-governed [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.Where they disagree, of course, is on whatthat structure is.For Aquinas all inclinations or appetites are end-governedand for Spinoza no motive tendency or appetite is.We can get something of the flavor of Spinoza s approach from a well-known discussion of freedom.After discussing God s freedom, Spinozawrites:Let us, however, descend to created things, which are all determined by exter-nal causes to exist,and to act in a definite and determined manner.In order thatthis may be clearly understood,let us think of a very simple thing.For instance,a stone receives from an external cause, which impels it, a certain quantity ofmotion, with which it will afterwards necessarily continue to move when theimpact of the external cause has ceased.This continuance of the stone in itsmotion is compelled,not because it is necessary,but because it must be definedby the impact of an external cause.32 (G iv.266;The Letters,295)After making this point about the stone, Spinoza next notes that thesame holds good of more complex systems:What is here said of a stone must be understood of each individual thing,how-ever composite and however adapted to various ends it may be thought to be(quantumvis illa composita, & ad plurima apta esse concipiatur): that is, each thing isnecessarily determined by an external cause to exist and act in a definite anddeterminate manner.(G iv.266;Correspondence,295)Then,finally,he considers the difference that cognition makes to this:Next,conceive,if you please,that the stone while it continues in motion thinks,and knows that it is striving as much as possible to continue in motion.Surelythis stone,inasmuch as it is conscious only of its own effort,and is far from indif-ferent,will believe that it is completely free,and that it continues in motion forno other reason than because it wants to.And such is the human freedom whichall men boast that they possess, and which consists solely in this, that men areconscious of their appetite (appetitus),and ignorant of the causes by which theyare determined.(G iv.266;Correspondence,295*)32The translation is taken from A.Wolf, The Correspondence of Spinoza [Correspondence](London:George Allen & Unwin,1928). 04-Garber-v2-chap04.qxd 8/4/05 11:34 AM Page 136136 John CarrieroSpinoza is suggesting here that (a) there is no significant differencebetween the rock s acquisition of a motive tendency and a complex sys-tem s acquisition of a motive tendency (all are set by external causes andremain until an external new cause comes along),and (b) human motivetendencies (here, appetite (appetitus) ) work in the same way.To judgefrom this passage,the only difference between us and the cognitive stoneis that the motive tendencies of which we are aware are more complex(namely, those associated with a system of matter that counts as thehuman body),not a difference in how we acquire motive tendencies orin their internal structure (viz., in whether or not they are internallyend-directed).The passage we have just considered is about freedom, and it is con-ceivable that Spinoza does think that human motive tendencies aresomehow acquired differently or somehow structured differently, butthat this is irrelevant to the point he wished to make there.To get a fullerpicture of his thought,let s look at his comments about appetite,desire,ends,final causes,and the perceived good in the Ethics.In EIIIP9S, after introducing his conatus doctrine, Spinoza offers aseries of definitions based on the idea of conatus.Although I think thatSpinoza holds that the defined terminology can be applied very gener-ally, I think he also holds that the terminology is especially associatedwith human activity:Schol.:When this striving is related only to the Mind, it is called Will;33 butwhen it is related to the Mind and Body together, it is called Appetite.ThisAppetite,therefore,is nothing but the very essence of man,from whose naturethere necessarily follow those things that promote his preservation.And so manis determined to do those things.Between appetite and desire there is no difference,except that desire is gen-erally related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetites (quatenus suiappetitus sunt conscii).So desire can be defined as appetite together with consciousness(conscientia) of the appetite.(G ii.147 8;C i.500)Notice, to begin with, that there is a single motive tendency, this striv-ing , that is found in both the human body and the human mind.This33On Spinoza s account of will the will is not characterized through its object,the good,as it was for the Aristotelians.In fact,on Spinoza s telling,there is not really a faculty of will atall there is just the joint product of the striving of all the constituent ideas of the mind.Thisbreaking of the will into pieces was adumbrated first in EIIP48. 04-Garber-v2-chap04.qxd 8/4/05 11:34 AM Page 137Spinoza on Final Causality 137was a point that Spinoza had emphasized earlier in Part 3,in EIIIP2S:All these things,indeed,show clearly that both the decision of the Mind and theappetite and the determination of the Body by nature exist together or ratherare one and the same thing, which we call a decision when it is consideredunder, and explained through, the attribute of Thought, and which we call adetermination when it is considered under the attribute of Extension anddeduced from the laws of motion and rest.(G ii.144;C i.497)The most obvious way to take these remarks is that there is a single basicstructure that can be related to body, mind, or both together.In partic-ular,if the motive tendencies connected with the human body are blind,that is, if they are not end-governed, then it is difficult to understandhow the same thing when considered under, and explained through,the attribute of Thought could be end-governed [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]