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.All options are still on the table.Take the projection forces.Brzezinski rightly notes that the European reaction will not be independent if thecrisis is serious.For the time being, that is certainly so.But an independent reaction in a less than vital conflictwould be a major step forward compared with the inability and unwillingness of the Europeans to act in somelow-intensity crises of recent years.Let us take the first step before the second.Europe will not be a military power, but it will not set limits to its ambition and be a soft power, the kind oflarger Switzerland Brzezinski refers to.Since the end of World War II the American attitude regarding European integration has always beenambiguous: unify, but not too much.The end of the Cold War has not altered this ambivalence: poor Europethat is incapable of going beyond a limited integration; happy America that has such an ally.Christoph Bertram, contributing editor, Foreign PolicyFor all its many good points, Brzezinski's prescription for the future U.S.European relationship is, in the finalanalysis, a complacent and hence a flawed one.It can be summed up in one sentence: Europe, far from turninginto a rival for the United States, will remain a dependent variable, a useful tool for U.S.strategy to spreadstability to as many countries outside Russia as possible by incorporating them; it should be humored but notregarded as an equal partner by the United States.On one issue Brzezinski is right: there is no need for Americans to panic as the EU tries to speed up defenseintegration.The angry fluster in some Washington corridors caused by plans for modest if urgent improvementsin European capabilities for "out of area" military intervention has no justification: whatever comes of the plan,in the event European forces will have to draw on U.S.assets and hence to gain prior U.S.agreement.But to make military power the litmus test of European integration is to repeat Stalin's mistake of judging theCatholic Church by the number of its divisions.Even Brzezinski, that most European of Americanrealpolitikers, does not understand what this emerging Europe is really about.For him, it is "a polity construedon convenience," not "conviction," a pragmatic device for shared prosperity and stability.But pragmatism failsto explain the extent to which proud states, steeped in their respective histories, have sacrificed nationalautonomy for European interdependence.What drove them to submit to the authority of common laws and acommon supreme court, to create a common currency, to unite the western part of the Continent, to invite thenew democracies of the rest of Europe into their midst, and now to try and develop the means for autonomousmilitary action was never merely convenience.It was, and is, a certain idea of what Europe should be.The power of this idea should not be underrated.Americans used to recognize this, patiently but persistentlyencouraging efforts at European integration during all the decades of the Cold War.Now, perhaps out ofirritation over Europe's new-found confidence, coupled with a one-track fascination with their own military andtechnological prowess and the dizziness of grandeur that has descended upon the world's only and probably lastsuperpower, Americans seem to have lost both the patience and the vision.Sadly, Brzezinski here provides astrategic rationale for this loss.It is shortsighted nevertheless, and for the very reasons the author himself states so eloquently at thebeginning of his article: "America and Europe together serve as the axis of global stability." There is no othersimilar partner for an America that cares about international order, prosperity and democratic progress.AndEurope, whatever its shortcomings, is a much stronger partner today than during the Cold War.It will bestronger still in the future. Therefore it should be America's prime interest to lay the foundations today for a partnership with the Europeof tomorrow.U.S.supremacy may last for a generation but it will not last forever.What better use to make ofthis temporary advantage than to establish now the institutional framework for a partnership in which a Europethat will be stronger than it is today and an America that will be weaker can work together for order, prosperityand democracy in tomorrow's world? That, Dr.Brzezinski, would be imaginative realpolitik!Timothy Carton Ash, fellow of St.Antony's College, OxfordAs I would always expect from Zbigniew Brzezinski, this essay is lucid, incisive, far-reaching and stimulating.I have the problem of agreeing with most of its analysis and policy recommendations, especially those onNATO and EU enlargement.Let me nonetheless, as an English European, tease out five points, partly indisagreement, partly in necessary elaboration.First, I am always in favor of saying things that are true, even if they are politically unhelpful.The statementthat Europe is a "de facto military protectorate of the United States" seems to me neither true nor helpful.If Isay "Xanadu is a French protectorate," this is generally understood to mean that the French run Xanadu.TheAmericans do not run Europe.Even in the weaker sense of "being dependent for military protection" thisstatement is scarcely true since, chaotic though Europe's defense arrangements are, there are no major currentthreats to our security against which the major European powers could not defend themselves and their EUpartners.Second, it is, however, true that even the strongest EU countries are still pathetically reliant on the UnitedStates in the case of any actual military action beyond the frontiers of the EU, even in a small patch of our ownbackyard such as Kosovo.I think one could usefully spell out that one major reason for this is that the leadersof Western Europe set the wrong priorities at the end of the Cold War, putting the creation of a commoncurrency before that of a common army.With the present initiatives for improved foreign policy and defensecoordination, the EU is doing in 2000 what it should have done in 1990.(I make the argument in more detail inmy new book, History of the Present [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.All options are still on the table.Take the projection forces.Brzezinski rightly notes that the European reaction will not be independent if thecrisis is serious.For the time being, that is certainly so.But an independent reaction in a less than vital conflictwould be a major step forward compared with the inability and unwillingness of the Europeans to act in somelow-intensity crises of recent years.Let us take the first step before the second.Europe will not be a military power, but it will not set limits to its ambition and be a soft power, the kind oflarger Switzerland Brzezinski refers to.Since the end of World War II the American attitude regarding European integration has always beenambiguous: unify, but not too much.The end of the Cold War has not altered this ambivalence: poor Europethat is incapable of going beyond a limited integration; happy America that has such an ally.Christoph Bertram, contributing editor, Foreign PolicyFor all its many good points, Brzezinski's prescription for the future U.S.European relationship is, in the finalanalysis, a complacent and hence a flawed one.It can be summed up in one sentence: Europe, far from turninginto a rival for the United States, will remain a dependent variable, a useful tool for U.S.strategy to spreadstability to as many countries outside Russia as possible by incorporating them; it should be humored but notregarded as an equal partner by the United States.On one issue Brzezinski is right: there is no need for Americans to panic as the EU tries to speed up defenseintegration.The angry fluster in some Washington corridors caused by plans for modest if urgent improvementsin European capabilities for "out of area" military intervention has no justification: whatever comes of the plan,in the event European forces will have to draw on U.S.assets and hence to gain prior U.S.agreement.But to make military power the litmus test of European integration is to repeat Stalin's mistake of judging theCatholic Church by the number of its divisions.Even Brzezinski, that most European of Americanrealpolitikers, does not understand what this emerging Europe is really about.For him, it is "a polity construedon convenience," not "conviction," a pragmatic device for shared prosperity and stability.But pragmatism failsto explain the extent to which proud states, steeped in their respective histories, have sacrificed nationalautonomy for European interdependence.What drove them to submit to the authority of common laws and acommon supreme court, to create a common currency, to unite the western part of the Continent, to invite thenew democracies of the rest of Europe into their midst, and now to try and develop the means for autonomousmilitary action was never merely convenience.It was, and is, a certain idea of what Europe should be.The power of this idea should not be underrated.Americans used to recognize this, patiently but persistentlyencouraging efforts at European integration during all the decades of the Cold War.Now, perhaps out ofirritation over Europe's new-found confidence, coupled with a one-track fascination with their own military andtechnological prowess and the dizziness of grandeur that has descended upon the world's only and probably lastsuperpower, Americans seem to have lost both the patience and the vision.Sadly, Brzezinski here provides astrategic rationale for this loss.It is shortsighted nevertheless, and for the very reasons the author himself states so eloquently at thebeginning of his article: "America and Europe together serve as the axis of global stability." There is no othersimilar partner for an America that cares about international order, prosperity and democratic progress.AndEurope, whatever its shortcomings, is a much stronger partner today than during the Cold War.It will bestronger still in the future. Therefore it should be America's prime interest to lay the foundations today for a partnership with the Europeof tomorrow.U.S.supremacy may last for a generation but it will not last forever.What better use to make ofthis temporary advantage than to establish now the institutional framework for a partnership in which a Europethat will be stronger than it is today and an America that will be weaker can work together for order, prosperityand democracy in tomorrow's world? That, Dr.Brzezinski, would be imaginative realpolitik!Timothy Carton Ash, fellow of St.Antony's College, OxfordAs I would always expect from Zbigniew Brzezinski, this essay is lucid, incisive, far-reaching and stimulating.I have the problem of agreeing with most of its analysis and policy recommendations, especially those onNATO and EU enlargement.Let me nonetheless, as an English European, tease out five points, partly indisagreement, partly in necessary elaboration.First, I am always in favor of saying things that are true, even if they are politically unhelpful.The statementthat Europe is a "de facto military protectorate of the United States" seems to me neither true nor helpful.If Isay "Xanadu is a French protectorate," this is generally understood to mean that the French run Xanadu.TheAmericans do not run Europe.Even in the weaker sense of "being dependent for military protection" thisstatement is scarcely true since, chaotic though Europe's defense arrangements are, there are no major currentthreats to our security against which the major European powers could not defend themselves and their EUpartners.Second, it is, however, true that even the strongest EU countries are still pathetically reliant on the UnitedStates in the case of any actual military action beyond the frontiers of the EU, even in a small patch of our ownbackyard such as Kosovo.I think one could usefully spell out that one major reason for this is that the leadersof Western Europe set the wrong priorities at the end of the Cold War, putting the creation of a commoncurrency before that of a common army.With the present initiatives for improved foreign policy and defensecoordination, the EU is doing in 2000 what it should have done in 1990.(I make the argument in more detail inmy new book, History of the Present [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]