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.The significant thing here is that though all these othercountries know this, and the Soviet Union and its community of nationsknow it too, the shield of secrecy spun by the ST here in the United Stateskeeps much of this information from our own eyes, ears, and minds.Then,when we hear other nations speaking quite openly of the things thisGovernment does that are not exactly aboveboard, there are those whowould say, "Those foreigners are always saying untrue and maliciousthings about us." In reality, they are doing nothing more than referring tothings that each of them knows we have done, because each of them has atone time or other been involved with us.This brings up another facet of this kind of operation.In many ofthese countries, governments are overthrown in fast succession and quiteunpredictably.What happens to the members of the inner circle of agovernment that was once in power and shared secrets with us, now that ithas been overthrown, and these same men are in exile or at least powerlessin their own country? Do they just forget all these past events? They notonly remember those events, but they capitalize on their knowledge inmany ways.Some are quite sophisticated, and they bide their time untilthey have a chance to contact the man who used to contact them whenthey were in power.Now they whisper that the new "in" government is"Communist-oriented" and that with a little help they can get back inpower.Others are less sophisticated and more direct.They make dealswhere they can to uncover other actions and networks in what they think isa loyal effort to help their old cause against the current government, not caring about the exposure of the United States, whether that matters tothem at all or not.And there are others who use their information for openblackmail.Some collect, and some disappear.The same is true of those who are voted out of office.They haveknown the inner workings of government.When someone tries to say thatthings were not quite as they were, many of these men, hoping to make apolitical comeback, are forced to reveal things that they have known.There have been a number of cases where this information aboutthird government participation with the United States in special operationshas led to subtle, legal blackmail.Each government gets foreign militaryaid according to a carefully worked out schedule.A number ofgovernments have used the CIA relationships they have established toplead for and to gain by heavy-handed methods hundreds of millions ofdollars worth of equipment that they could not have gotten otherwise.In summary, there are few if any men in government, from the NSCon down through the executive branch, or in the Congress, who have hadthe opportunity to put enough of these events together to see how heavyand oppressive twenty or more years of accumulated clandestineoperations can be.When a new Assistant Secretary of Defense orAssistant Secretary of State can say in public something like, "The UnitedStates has no combat troops in Laos, and it has not had any there, and itwill not have any there," at least fifteen or twenty other nations can listenand recall that they have at one time or other directly participated inactions that involved American combat troops in Laos; or, since this isintended as an example only, in some other country.In many such casesthe person who makes such a statement is known either to be uninformedor lying.There is a good story about American Army troops in Laos.Aboutfifteen years ago an agreement had been reached whereby the U.S.Government would take over certain training functions and the Frenchwould leave.Some French were to remain as advisers in government andas a training cadre with the armed forces of Laos.By a local agreementworked out with the Government of Laos and with the senior Frenchofficials there, a Military Aid Program was established, calling for thedelivery of large quantities of U.S.-manufactured military weapons.However, the use of many of these weapons was dependent upon a degreeof training and sophistication beyond the ability of the Laotian army.TheAmerican ambassador volunteered that he could arrange for Americancivilian training personnel to come to Laos for the sole purpose of trainingthe armed forces of that country on American equipment.This offer wasaccepted, and it was broadened to include military matters, which at thattime were included in the general concept of civic action.This gave theseU.S.training personnel broader responsibilities, to include such things asirrigation, village hygiene and sanitation, rudimentary school-buildingconstruction, and related tasks, all in addition to the regular weaponsorientation.It also included basic electronics work and communicationsindoctrination of a low order of skill.By the time this whole program had been packaged, the requirement for instructors had grown to severalhundred.Although this entire endeavor had the appearance of beingentirely overt and coming under the responsibility of the ambassador, itwas his invisible staff of CIA men who had worked up the idea tocounteract French influence, which was admittedly at a low ebb followingthe defeat at Dien Bien Phu.In those days there was as much animositybetween the CIA and the French as between the CIA and the Pathet Lao.The CIA team got the military assistance program approved and theequipment destined for Laos.The next thing was to get the civilianinstructors.To accomplish this task, they beefed up their own staff with anumber of new men and then turned to the Army for volunteers, whowould be sheep-dipped and sent to Laos as "civilians".(The term "sheep-dipped" appears in The New York Times versionof the Pentagon Papers without clarification.It is an intricate Army-devised process by which a man who is in the service as a full careersoldier or officer agrees to go through all the legal and official motions ofresigning from the service.Then, rather than actually being released, hisrecords are pulled from the Army personnel files and transferred to aspecial Army intelligence file.Substitute but nonetheless real-appearingrecords are then processed, and the man "leaves" the service.He isencouraged to write to friends and give a cover reason why he got out.Hegoes to his bank and charge card services and changes his status tocivilian, and does the hundreds of other official and personal things thatany man would do if he really had gotten out of the service.Meanwhile,his real Army records are kept in secrecy, but not forgotten.If hiscontemporaries get promoted, he gets promoted.All of the things that canbe done for his hidden records to keep him even with his peers are done.Some very real problems arise in the event he gets killed or captured as aprisoner [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.The significant thing here is that though all these othercountries know this, and the Soviet Union and its community of nationsknow it too, the shield of secrecy spun by the ST here in the United Stateskeeps much of this information from our own eyes, ears, and minds.Then,when we hear other nations speaking quite openly of the things thisGovernment does that are not exactly aboveboard, there are those whowould say, "Those foreigners are always saying untrue and maliciousthings about us." In reality, they are doing nothing more than referring tothings that each of them knows we have done, because each of them has atone time or other been involved with us.This brings up another facet of this kind of operation.In many ofthese countries, governments are overthrown in fast succession and quiteunpredictably.What happens to the members of the inner circle of agovernment that was once in power and shared secrets with us, now that ithas been overthrown, and these same men are in exile or at least powerlessin their own country? Do they just forget all these past events? They notonly remember those events, but they capitalize on their knowledge inmany ways.Some are quite sophisticated, and they bide their time untilthey have a chance to contact the man who used to contact them whenthey were in power.Now they whisper that the new "in" government is"Communist-oriented" and that with a little help they can get back inpower.Others are less sophisticated and more direct.They make dealswhere they can to uncover other actions and networks in what they think isa loyal effort to help their old cause against the current government, not caring about the exposure of the United States, whether that matters tothem at all or not.And there are others who use their information for openblackmail.Some collect, and some disappear.The same is true of those who are voted out of office.They haveknown the inner workings of government.When someone tries to say thatthings were not quite as they were, many of these men, hoping to make apolitical comeback, are forced to reveal things that they have known.There have been a number of cases where this information aboutthird government participation with the United States in special operationshas led to subtle, legal blackmail.Each government gets foreign militaryaid according to a carefully worked out schedule.A number ofgovernments have used the CIA relationships they have established toplead for and to gain by heavy-handed methods hundreds of millions ofdollars worth of equipment that they could not have gotten otherwise.In summary, there are few if any men in government, from the NSCon down through the executive branch, or in the Congress, who have hadthe opportunity to put enough of these events together to see how heavyand oppressive twenty or more years of accumulated clandestineoperations can be.When a new Assistant Secretary of Defense orAssistant Secretary of State can say in public something like, "The UnitedStates has no combat troops in Laos, and it has not had any there, and itwill not have any there," at least fifteen or twenty other nations can listenand recall that they have at one time or other directly participated inactions that involved American combat troops in Laos; or, since this isintended as an example only, in some other country.In many such casesthe person who makes such a statement is known either to be uninformedor lying.There is a good story about American Army troops in Laos.Aboutfifteen years ago an agreement had been reached whereby the U.S.Government would take over certain training functions and the Frenchwould leave.Some French were to remain as advisers in government andas a training cadre with the armed forces of Laos.By a local agreementworked out with the Government of Laos and with the senior Frenchofficials there, a Military Aid Program was established, calling for thedelivery of large quantities of U.S.-manufactured military weapons.However, the use of many of these weapons was dependent upon a degreeof training and sophistication beyond the ability of the Laotian army.TheAmerican ambassador volunteered that he could arrange for Americancivilian training personnel to come to Laos for the sole purpose of trainingthe armed forces of that country on American equipment.This offer wasaccepted, and it was broadened to include military matters, which at thattime were included in the general concept of civic action.This gave theseU.S.training personnel broader responsibilities, to include such things asirrigation, village hygiene and sanitation, rudimentary school-buildingconstruction, and related tasks, all in addition to the regular weaponsorientation.It also included basic electronics work and communicationsindoctrination of a low order of skill.By the time this whole program had been packaged, the requirement for instructors had grown to severalhundred.Although this entire endeavor had the appearance of beingentirely overt and coming under the responsibility of the ambassador, itwas his invisible staff of CIA men who had worked up the idea tocounteract French influence, which was admittedly at a low ebb followingthe defeat at Dien Bien Phu.In those days there was as much animositybetween the CIA and the French as between the CIA and the Pathet Lao.The CIA team got the military assistance program approved and theequipment destined for Laos.The next thing was to get the civilianinstructors.To accomplish this task, they beefed up their own staff with anumber of new men and then turned to the Army for volunteers, whowould be sheep-dipped and sent to Laos as "civilians".(The term "sheep-dipped" appears in The New York Times versionof the Pentagon Papers without clarification.It is an intricate Army-devised process by which a man who is in the service as a full careersoldier or officer agrees to go through all the legal and official motions ofresigning from the service.Then, rather than actually being released, hisrecords are pulled from the Army personnel files and transferred to aspecial Army intelligence file.Substitute but nonetheless real-appearingrecords are then processed, and the man "leaves" the service.He isencouraged to write to friends and give a cover reason why he got out.Hegoes to his bank and charge card services and changes his status tocivilian, and does the hundreds of other official and personal things thatany man would do if he really had gotten out of the service.Meanwhile,his real Army records are kept in secrecy, but not forgotten.If hiscontemporaries get promoted, he gets promoted.All of the things that canbe done for his hidden records to keep him even with his peers are done.Some very real problems arise in the event he gets killed or captured as aprisoner [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]