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.The treaty also asserted the status quo elsewhere in theregion, including the level of fortifications of bases.During the1920s, Japan became a major U.S.trading partner: 40 percent ofJapanese trade went to the United States.However, anti-Japanesefeeling continued in California, among some naval officers, and inthe press owned by William Randolph Hearst.The Japanese ex-clusion clause in the National Origins Act of 1924 closed off anyfurther Japanese immigration.The Japanese were deeply insulted bythe anti-Asian tone of this legislation.The global economic depression hit Japan severely.The high U.S.Smoot Hawley tariff (1930) aggravated Japan s economic problems.At the same time, Chinese nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek wereshowing ambitions toward reasserting Chinese control of Manchuria.Officers in the Japanese army of Kwantung responded by contrivingthe Mukden incident (September 1931).In the Manchurian Crisisthat followed, Japan occupied the region.Japanese naval forcestook aggressive action in the Shanghai Incident (January 1932).These actions were initiated by junior officers in the field but subse-quently endorsed in Tokyo, which moved to create the puppet stateof Manchukuo, headed by the former Chinese emperor, Pu Yi.OnlyGermany and Italy were to recognize this state; the United States inthe Stimson Doctrine followed a policy of nonrecognition.PresidentHerbert Hoover s belief that economic sanctions would lead to warmeant that no other action was taken.During the Shanghai Incident,the small U.S.Asiatic fleet had been deployed to Shanghai at Sec-retary of State Henry Stimson s request, and Joseph C.Grew wasappointed as ambassador to Japan.Grew came to the conclusion thattaking a vociferous moral stance without backing it up with the threatof force only encouraged Japanese militants.These militants were increasingly taking control in Japan as thedepression saw the collapse of liberal government and the rise ofultra-patriotism.Military officers became the dominating force ingovernment, and moderates often suffered assassination if they pro-tested.Ideas began to be propagated of an East Asian co-prosperitysphere ostensibly economic cooperation among states to be liber-ated from European colonialism, but in fact a mask for imperialism 180 " JAPANby Japan.Plans were launched in 1936 to militarize Japanese societyand assert hegemony in China, and the navy forced a withdrawalfrom the Five Power Treaty and from agreements reached at the 1930London Naval Disarmament Conference.They demanded a drivesouthward to acquire bases and the resources in which Japan wasdeficient, which included virtually everything needed by an industrialstate.In this tense situation, an incident in July 1937 at the Marco PoloBridge outside Peking (Beijing) began the second Sino JapaneseWar (1937 45).Peking soon fell, Shanghai was heavily bombardedagain, and the capital Nanking (Nanjing) was captured with greatbloodshed (known as the Rape of Nanking ) in December.ChiangKai-shek retreated to Chungking (Chongqing).Japan secured controlof all the major Chinese ports over the next 18 months, with theexception of those in European hands.In the U.S.State Department,official Stanley K.Hornbeck advised that Japan should be opposed,but President Franklin D.Roosevelt followed Grew s advice andavoided a confrontation that he could not back up with force, theU.S.Navy being considerably inferior in the region.Thus, when theUSS Panay was sunk by Japanese airplanes on 12 December 1937,Roosevelt was ready to accept the Japanese apology and indemnity.U.S.public opinion was supportive of this policy of noninvolve-ment, despite sympathies for China.The policy convinced Japanesemilitary leaders that the United States lacked the will to defend itsinterests or principles in Asia.Until 1940, U.S.policy was inconsistent.On the one hand, tradecontinued with Japan, providing many materials that aided Japan swar machine, such as airplane engines, scrap metal, and oil.On theother, Chinese silver was purchased in large amounts, enabling Chinato purchase American weapons.Such transactions were permissibleas the Neutrality Acts were not activated.Secretary of State CordellHull pressed U.S.aircraft manufacturers to carry out a moral em-bargo on sales to Japan, in place of the statutory embargo.The situation changed during World War II.Japan was initiallyimpressed by the stance taken by France and Great Britain in declar-ing war on Nazi Germany in September 1939.However, Japan srespect for the power of the imperial states was destroyed by thesweeping German successes in the summer of 1940.The defeat of JAPAN " 181France and the Netherlands left their Asian colonies very vulnerable.At the same time, U.S.policies began to take a clearer line: Hullannounced the abrogation of the 1911 U.S. Japan Treaty of Com-merce and Navigation.European weakness prompted Roosevelt tomove the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor as a deterrent [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.The treaty also asserted the status quo elsewhere in theregion, including the level of fortifications of bases.During the1920s, Japan became a major U.S.trading partner: 40 percent ofJapanese trade went to the United States.However, anti-Japanesefeeling continued in California, among some naval officers, and inthe press owned by William Randolph Hearst.The Japanese ex-clusion clause in the National Origins Act of 1924 closed off anyfurther Japanese immigration.The Japanese were deeply insulted bythe anti-Asian tone of this legislation.The global economic depression hit Japan severely.The high U.S.Smoot Hawley tariff (1930) aggravated Japan s economic problems.At the same time, Chinese nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek wereshowing ambitions toward reasserting Chinese control of Manchuria.Officers in the Japanese army of Kwantung responded by contrivingthe Mukden incident (September 1931).In the Manchurian Crisisthat followed, Japan occupied the region.Japanese naval forcestook aggressive action in the Shanghai Incident (January 1932).These actions were initiated by junior officers in the field but subse-quently endorsed in Tokyo, which moved to create the puppet stateof Manchukuo, headed by the former Chinese emperor, Pu Yi.OnlyGermany and Italy were to recognize this state; the United States inthe Stimson Doctrine followed a policy of nonrecognition.PresidentHerbert Hoover s belief that economic sanctions would lead to warmeant that no other action was taken.During the Shanghai Incident,the small U.S.Asiatic fleet had been deployed to Shanghai at Sec-retary of State Henry Stimson s request, and Joseph C.Grew wasappointed as ambassador to Japan.Grew came to the conclusion thattaking a vociferous moral stance without backing it up with the threatof force only encouraged Japanese militants.These militants were increasingly taking control in Japan as thedepression saw the collapse of liberal government and the rise ofultra-patriotism.Military officers became the dominating force ingovernment, and moderates often suffered assassination if they pro-tested.Ideas began to be propagated of an East Asian co-prosperitysphere ostensibly economic cooperation among states to be liber-ated from European colonialism, but in fact a mask for imperialism 180 " JAPANby Japan.Plans were launched in 1936 to militarize Japanese societyand assert hegemony in China, and the navy forced a withdrawalfrom the Five Power Treaty and from agreements reached at the 1930London Naval Disarmament Conference.They demanded a drivesouthward to acquire bases and the resources in which Japan wasdeficient, which included virtually everything needed by an industrialstate.In this tense situation, an incident in July 1937 at the Marco PoloBridge outside Peking (Beijing) began the second Sino JapaneseWar (1937 45).Peking soon fell, Shanghai was heavily bombardedagain, and the capital Nanking (Nanjing) was captured with greatbloodshed (known as the Rape of Nanking ) in December.ChiangKai-shek retreated to Chungking (Chongqing).Japan secured controlof all the major Chinese ports over the next 18 months, with theexception of those in European hands.In the U.S.State Department,official Stanley K.Hornbeck advised that Japan should be opposed,but President Franklin D.Roosevelt followed Grew s advice andavoided a confrontation that he could not back up with force, theU.S.Navy being considerably inferior in the region.Thus, when theUSS Panay was sunk by Japanese airplanes on 12 December 1937,Roosevelt was ready to accept the Japanese apology and indemnity.U.S.public opinion was supportive of this policy of noninvolve-ment, despite sympathies for China.The policy convinced Japanesemilitary leaders that the United States lacked the will to defend itsinterests or principles in Asia.Until 1940, U.S.policy was inconsistent.On the one hand, tradecontinued with Japan, providing many materials that aided Japan swar machine, such as airplane engines, scrap metal, and oil.On theother, Chinese silver was purchased in large amounts, enabling Chinato purchase American weapons.Such transactions were permissibleas the Neutrality Acts were not activated.Secretary of State CordellHull pressed U.S.aircraft manufacturers to carry out a moral em-bargo on sales to Japan, in place of the statutory embargo.The situation changed during World War II.Japan was initiallyimpressed by the stance taken by France and Great Britain in declar-ing war on Nazi Germany in September 1939.However, Japan srespect for the power of the imperial states was destroyed by thesweeping German successes in the summer of 1940.The defeat of JAPAN " 181France and the Netherlands left their Asian colonies very vulnerable.At the same time, U.S.policies began to take a clearer line: Hullannounced the abrogation of the 1911 U.S. Japan Treaty of Com-merce and Navigation.European weakness prompted Roosevelt tomove the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor as a deterrent [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]