[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.All services, like neglected siblings competing for their parents attention,will demand participation, and there is no civilian or uniformed authoritywilling to discipline them not the national command authorities, not theunified commands, and not the JCS chairman.The authority exists; the willdoes not. ConclusionNo military organization can reform itself. Alfred Thayer Mahan1In the decade and a half following the Cold War, the United States produceda smaller but not a different military force.The producer chain of commandattempted to maintain its next-generation weapon system acquisition pro-grams derived from Cold War requirements and attempted to hold on to asmuch of its Cold War force as possible.The user chain of command, in con-trast, was confronted with the demands of an interwar period.The high tempoof operations that began in the Clinton years and accelerated under theyounger Bush, coupled with the reduced force size, created change in the fieldwhile forces were in contact with the enemy.The services, the dominant play-ers in the producer chain, buttressed by their benefactors in Congress, failedmiserably to transform the force from one designed for great power conflictinto a force designed for small wars in the third world.Had the end of the Cold War been recognized for what it was a transi-tion from an era of great power conflict to an interwar era dominated bysmall wars and gunboat diplomacy a rational plan could have been adopted.Either the transition was not recognized or it was ignored in favor of continu-ing parochial pursuits.The evidence would suggest that both are true.The nation s defense needs 10, 15, or 20 years hence are unknowable.Butthe country s immediate needs after the fall of the Berlin Wall were far morepredictable.Recognition of the changed strategic environment could have,should have, led to a shift from major-war thinking to small-wars thinking.That shift in thinking could and should have been followed by a change as 258 Shaping U.S.Military Forcessignificant as Britain s strategic transformations preceding and succeedingWorld War I.The president s national security strategy is dutifully translated into thechairman s national military strategy.Hosts of other planning documents aredeveloped that focus largely on what equipment to buy.And yet the forceis not transformed.Transformation, apparently, has taken place only in bat-tle, governed by employment policy.Yet most Pentagon force developmentprocesses are bound up in declaratory policy, and they are dominated by theinstitutional services focused on major war.The invisible hand of slowlychanging service cultures steers a steady course.Special operations forces, parts of the light army, and the Marine Corpswere already small-wars oriented and immediately felt the strain of carryingthe main effort while the big services continued to prepare for major war.TheNavy would not be asked to dock its ships and send its troops ashore.The AirForce would not be asked to park its aircraft to free personnel for the complexwork of small wars.The burden of transforming from major war to small warwould fall to the Army.The big army would be forced to change to be relevantin opposition to its newly acquired equipment-centric nature.It would resistmightily.That the Army chose to retain organizations for major war ratherthan for small wars went unchallenged in the producer chain of command, butthe relevance of heavy divisions was challenged in the user chain of commandwhen heavy forces were assigned infantry missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan,and Iraq.THE CONTINUING NEED FOR EXTERNALINTERVENTIONThe services alone cannot transform the military capability of the UnitedStates.The Army cannot decide to withdraw forward deployed forces fromKorea or Europe.The Air Force cannot prepare forward operating bases inuncooperative countries.The services cannot decide which missions to accept.The president will continue to define declaratory and employment policy todrive the transformation.Congress remains focused on acquiring weapon sys-tems and can thus guide modernization, but it has avoided declaratory andemployment policy.The services can be expected to pursue modernization oftheir weapons and to resist change in their view of warfare.Congress will needto intervene on both fronts to accomplish anything more than modernization.The president appoints the service chiefs, the chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, and the commanders of the combatant commands subject to Senateconfirmation.The combatant commands are firmly rooted in the near-termuse of force.The law requires that the services provide forces for the combat-ant commands, not the forces the services want to build.If the services are notproviding the forces that the combatant commands need today for example,heavy forces for mid-intensity conflict instead of light forces for low-intensityconflict then service chiefs and secretaries are at fault. Conclusion 259The service chiefs and secretaries dominate the producer chain of com-mand.The president can nominate a custodian or a change agent and theSenate must approve.Custodians will fight for their service s share of thedefense budget and champion the service s programs.To a significant extent,custodial service chiefs reflect the culture of the service and its past [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.All services, like neglected siblings competing for their parents attention,will demand participation, and there is no civilian or uniformed authoritywilling to discipline them not the national command authorities, not theunified commands, and not the JCS chairman.The authority exists; the willdoes not. ConclusionNo military organization can reform itself. Alfred Thayer Mahan1In the decade and a half following the Cold War, the United States produceda smaller but not a different military force.The producer chain of commandattempted to maintain its next-generation weapon system acquisition pro-grams derived from Cold War requirements and attempted to hold on to asmuch of its Cold War force as possible.The user chain of command, in con-trast, was confronted with the demands of an interwar period.The high tempoof operations that began in the Clinton years and accelerated under theyounger Bush, coupled with the reduced force size, created change in the fieldwhile forces were in contact with the enemy.The services, the dominant play-ers in the producer chain, buttressed by their benefactors in Congress, failedmiserably to transform the force from one designed for great power conflictinto a force designed for small wars in the third world.Had the end of the Cold War been recognized for what it was a transi-tion from an era of great power conflict to an interwar era dominated bysmall wars and gunboat diplomacy a rational plan could have been adopted.Either the transition was not recognized or it was ignored in favor of continu-ing parochial pursuits.The evidence would suggest that both are true.The nation s defense needs 10, 15, or 20 years hence are unknowable.Butthe country s immediate needs after the fall of the Berlin Wall were far morepredictable.Recognition of the changed strategic environment could have,should have, led to a shift from major-war thinking to small-wars thinking.That shift in thinking could and should have been followed by a change as 258 Shaping U.S.Military Forcessignificant as Britain s strategic transformations preceding and succeedingWorld War I.The president s national security strategy is dutifully translated into thechairman s national military strategy.Hosts of other planning documents aredeveloped that focus largely on what equipment to buy.And yet the forceis not transformed.Transformation, apparently, has taken place only in bat-tle, governed by employment policy.Yet most Pentagon force developmentprocesses are bound up in declaratory policy, and they are dominated by theinstitutional services focused on major war.The invisible hand of slowlychanging service cultures steers a steady course.Special operations forces, parts of the light army, and the Marine Corpswere already small-wars oriented and immediately felt the strain of carryingthe main effort while the big services continued to prepare for major war.TheNavy would not be asked to dock its ships and send its troops ashore.The AirForce would not be asked to park its aircraft to free personnel for the complexwork of small wars.The burden of transforming from major war to small warwould fall to the Army.The big army would be forced to change to be relevantin opposition to its newly acquired equipment-centric nature.It would resistmightily.That the Army chose to retain organizations for major war ratherthan for small wars went unchallenged in the producer chain of command, butthe relevance of heavy divisions was challenged in the user chain of commandwhen heavy forces were assigned infantry missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan,and Iraq.THE CONTINUING NEED FOR EXTERNALINTERVENTIONThe services alone cannot transform the military capability of the UnitedStates.The Army cannot decide to withdraw forward deployed forces fromKorea or Europe.The Air Force cannot prepare forward operating bases inuncooperative countries.The services cannot decide which missions to accept.The president will continue to define declaratory and employment policy todrive the transformation.Congress remains focused on acquiring weapon sys-tems and can thus guide modernization, but it has avoided declaratory andemployment policy.The services can be expected to pursue modernization oftheir weapons and to resist change in their view of warfare.Congress will needto intervene on both fronts to accomplish anything more than modernization.The president appoints the service chiefs, the chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, and the commanders of the combatant commands subject to Senateconfirmation.The combatant commands are firmly rooted in the near-termuse of force.The law requires that the services provide forces for the combat-ant commands, not the forces the services want to build.If the services are notproviding the forces that the combatant commands need today for example,heavy forces for mid-intensity conflict instead of light forces for low-intensityconflict then service chiefs and secretaries are at fault. Conclusion 259The service chiefs and secretaries dominate the producer chain of com-mand.The president can nominate a custodian or a change agent and theSenate must approve.Custodians will fight for their service s share of thedefense budget and champion the service s programs.To a significant extent,custodial service chiefs reflect the culture of the service and its past [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]