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.e., syntactically characterized) states; people in the samethese tokens do not have the same character, but only the samesyntactic states can implement those states in physically differentsyntax, and the different overcoats play the counterpart roles of theways.And, of course, looking in the other direction, we can see thatlinguistic conventions of Kaplan's stage (0).two people narrowly construed as being in the same state can beThe point is that Kaplan's schema is a special case of somethingreconstrued as being in different states if we redraw the boundariesvery general.Whenever we are describing a functional system, if we12between the people's states and the surrounding environment.draw a boundary between the system "proper" and some context orenvironmental niche in which it resides, we find we can characterizeNotional Attitudesa Kaplan-style schemaC + E-H> JIn the face of the objections of Putnam and others to "classical" prop-ositional attitudes, we adverted to the question: what is the organ-where C is a character-like concept of narrow or intra-systemic appli-ismic contribution to the fixation of propositional attitudes? Thecation; E is the concept of an embedding context or environment ofanswer would characterize psychological states "in the narrowoperation, and lis a richer semantic (or functional) characterization ofsense." The attempt to capture these narrow psychological statethe systemic role in question than that provided by C alone.Wheretypes as sentential attitudes ran into a variety of problems, chief ofthe system in question is a representing or believing system, "richer"which was that any sentential attitude characterization, being essen-means closer to determining a (classical) proposition, or, if we includetially a syntactical type-casting, would cut too fine.In Putnam'sKaplan's stage (2) as the ultimate step in this progression, richer inthought experiment we grant that physical replicahood is suffi-the sense of being closer to ultimate reference to things in the world.cient but not necessary for identity of organismic contribution; weIn other contexts such as characterizations of functional compo-could also grant that the weaker similarity captured by syntactic repli-nents in biology or engineering (see Wimsatt 1974) the "richer"cahood (at some level of abstraction) would be sufficient for identitycharacterization tells us more about the functional point of the item:of organismic contribution, but even though identity of organismicwhat is narrowly seen as a spark-producer is seen, in context, to be acontribution narrow-psychological twinhood is a very stringentfuel-igniter, to take an overworked example.condition, it would not seem to require syntactic twinhood, at anyMoving from stage to stage in such an interpretation schema, onelevel of description.Consider the somewhat analogous question: dosees that the richer the semantics of a particular stage, the moreall Turing machines that compute the same function share a syntacticabstract or tolerant the syntax.Sentences with different physical(i.e., machine table) description? No, unless we adjust our levels ofproperties can have the same syntax.Sentences with different syntaxcan have the same character.Sentences with different character can12.Burge (1979) presents an extended thought experiment about beliefs about arthritisthat can be seen as drawing the boundary between the system proper and its environ-11."Subserves" is a useful hand-waving term for which we may thank the neuro-ment outside the biological individual entirely; the contextual variations involve socialphysiologists.Putting two bits of jargon together, we can say a belief supervenes on thepractices outside the experience of the subject.(For a criticism of Burge, see chapter 8.)state that subserves it. 152The Intentional Stance Beyond Belief153description of the machine table and the input-output behavior soA notional world should be viewed as a sort of fictional world de-that they coalesce trivially.What should count as equivalence forvised by a theorist, a third-party observer, in order to characterize theTuring machines (or computer programs) is a vexed question; itnarrow-psychological states of a subject.A notional world can bewould not be if it weren't for the fact that nontrivially different de-supposed to be full of notional objects, and the scene of notionalscriptions in terms of internal "syntax" can yield the same "contribu-events all the objects and events the subject believes in, you mighttion" at some useful level of description.say.If we relax our methodological solipsism for a moment, we willThe analogy is imperfect, no doubt, and other considerationsnote that some objects in the real world inhabited by a subjecte.g., biological considerations might weigh in favor of supposing"match" objects in the subject's notional world, but others do not.that complete narrow-psychological twinhood required syntactic twin-The real world contains many things and events having no counter-hood at some level, but even if that were granted, it would not at allparts in any subject's notional world (excluding the notional world offollow that partial psychological similarity can always be described inan omniscient God), and the notional worlds of gullible or confusedsome general system of syntactic description applicable to all whoor ontologically profligate subjects will contain notional objects hav-share the psychological trait.People who are vain, or paranoid, foring no counterparts in the real world.The task of describing theinstance, are surely psychologically similar; a large part of the similar-relations that may exist between things in the real world and things inity in each case would seem well captured by talking of similar orsomeone's notional world is notoriously puzzle-ridden that is oneshared beliefs.Even if one takes a self-defeatingly stringent line onreason to retreat to methodological solipsism: to factor out those trou-belief-identity (according to which no two people ever really share ablesome issues temporarily [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.e., syntactically characterized) states; people in the samethese tokens do not have the same character, but only the samesyntactic states can implement those states in physically differentsyntax, and the different overcoats play the counterpart roles of theways.And, of course, looking in the other direction, we can see thatlinguistic conventions of Kaplan's stage (0).two people narrowly construed as being in the same state can beThe point is that Kaplan's schema is a special case of somethingreconstrued as being in different states if we redraw the boundariesvery general.Whenever we are describing a functional system, if we12between the people's states and the surrounding environment.draw a boundary between the system "proper" and some context orenvironmental niche in which it resides, we find we can characterizeNotional Attitudesa Kaplan-style schemaC + E-H> JIn the face of the objections of Putnam and others to "classical" prop-ositional attitudes, we adverted to the question: what is the organ-where C is a character-like concept of narrow or intra-systemic appli-ismic contribution to the fixation of propositional attitudes? Thecation; E is the concept of an embedding context or environment ofanswer would characterize psychological states "in the narrowoperation, and lis a richer semantic (or functional) characterization ofsense." The attempt to capture these narrow psychological statethe systemic role in question than that provided by C alone.Wheretypes as sentential attitudes ran into a variety of problems, chief ofthe system in question is a representing or believing system, "richer"which was that any sentential attitude characterization, being essen-means closer to determining a (classical) proposition, or, if we includetially a syntactical type-casting, would cut too fine.In Putnam'sKaplan's stage (2) as the ultimate step in this progression, richer inthought experiment we grant that physical replicahood is suffi-the sense of being closer to ultimate reference to things in the world.cient but not necessary for identity of organismic contribution; weIn other contexts such as characterizations of functional compo-could also grant that the weaker similarity captured by syntactic repli-nents in biology or engineering (see Wimsatt 1974) the "richer"cahood (at some level of abstraction) would be sufficient for identitycharacterization tells us more about the functional point of the item:of organismic contribution, but even though identity of organismicwhat is narrowly seen as a spark-producer is seen, in context, to be acontribution narrow-psychological twinhood is a very stringentfuel-igniter, to take an overworked example.condition, it would not seem to require syntactic twinhood, at anyMoving from stage to stage in such an interpretation schema, onelevel of description.Consider the somewhat analogous question: dosees that the richer the semantics of a particular stage, the moreall Turing machines that compute the same function share a syntacticabstract or tolerant the syntax.Sentences with different physical(i.e., machine table) description? No, unless we adjust our levels ofproperties can have the same syntax.Sentences with different syntaxcan have the same character.Sentences with different character can12.Burge (1979) presents an extended thought experiment about beliefs about arthritisthat can be seen as drawing the boundary between the system proper and its environ-11."Subserves" is a useful hand-waving term for which we may thank the neuro-ment outside the biological individual entirely; the contextual variations involve socialphysiologists.Putting two bits of jargon together, we can say a belief supervenes on thepractices outside the experience of the subject.(For a criticism of Burge, see chapter 8.)state that subserves it. 152The Intentional Stance Beyond Belief153description of the machine table and the input-output behavior soA notional world should be viewed as a sort of fictional world de-that they coalesce trivially.What should count as equivalence forvised by a theorist, a third-party observer, in order to characterize theTuring machines (or computer programs) is a vexed question; itnarrow-psychological states of a subject.A notional world can bewould not be if it weren't for the fact that nontrivially different de-supposed to be full of notional objects, and the scene of notionalscriptions in terms of internal "syntax" can yield the same "contribu-events all the objects and events the subject believes in, you mighttion" at some useful level of description.say.If we relax our methodological solipsism for a moment, we willThe analogy is imperfect, no doubt, and other considerationsnote that some objects in the real world inhabited by a subjecte.g., biological considerations might weigh in favor of supposing"match" objects in the subject's notional world, but others do not.that complete narrow-psychological twinhood required syntactic twin-The real world contains many things and events having no counter-hood at some level, but even if that were granted, it would not at allparts in any subject's notional world (excluding the notional world offollow that partial psychological similarity can always be described inan omniscient God), and the notional worlds of gullible or confusedsome general system of syntactic description applicable to all whoor ontologically profligate subjects will contain notional objects hav-share the psychological trait.People who are vain, or paranoid, foring no counterparts in the real world.The task of describing theinstance, are surely psychologically similar; a large part of the similar-relations that may exist between things in the real world and things inity in each case would seem well captured by talking of similar orsomeone's notional world is notoriously puzzle-ridden that is oneshared beliefs.Even if one takes a self-defeatingly stringent line onreason to retreat to methodological solipsism: to factor out those trou-belief-identity (according to which no two people ever really share ablesome issues temporarily [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]