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.Now, the hominid could not have learned this behavioural pattern inthe first place without the ability to link his representations of how to stripleaves and dip for ants.What he needs now, in order to form a conceptof an ant dipper, is to compare his representations and see what theyhave in common: to form a representation, in other words, of the linkthat he has already made between the two.He needs to recognize thefact that the two activities are linked by the stick (or more accurately itsdipper properties being long, thin, etc.), and in so doing he will free hisrepresentation of that object from its original context as a bridge betweentwo other representations.Indeed, the establishment of a concept will always initially be a com-parative process: we need to be able to compare our notions, in orderto abstract their important common features from the various contexts. Early Cultural Evolution 133This is reminiscent of the fact that an important part of any replicator scontent is determined by the differences between itself and its alleles.Whatwe humans can do is to see those differences, and to form representationsof them and as soon as a creature can compare its representations witheach other, its mental life loses its dependence on the external world.A creature whose representations are tied to a limited range of exter-nal stimuli and actions cannot manipulate those representations in adifferent context from that limited range.A creature whose represen-tations have been freed from those bonds, however, may manipulate itsconcepts quite independently of their original contexts.No longer doits representations depend on external stimulation: representations oflinks between representations can be triggered by the original represen-tations themselves, whether or not the creature finds itself in their usualcontext.Meta-Representation TodayMy claim that the emergence of concepts is always a comparative pro-cess gains credence from a consideration of how meta-representationalconcepts emerge, even today.Few people have any clear recollection ofthe way in which they first grasped concepts such as sheep , tree andother basic elements of our understanding of our surroundings.We can,though, be clearer about our more recent acquisition of more complexconcepts such as cantilever , or harmonic minor scale .They appearto be acquired in two steps: at first the notion will be a peripheral partof a theory or activity, the bulk of which is familiar.The reason why it isperipheral is that our understanding and use of it is wholly context de-pendent.We are not able to speak of that entity outside the circumstancesin which we usually encounter it, for our interaction with it depends onour interaction with its context.As an example, consider the concept ofa cantilever.Many people have seen the Forth Bridge; plenty of womenwear a bra; in most of our houses there are shelves.A cantilever is there-fore a structure familiar to most, yet without some additional stimulusmany people will never acquire its concept (meta-representation).The second step the step that will disentangle the relevant word or en-tity from its usual circumstances will be the combination (in varying pro-portions) of its familiarity, and an appropriate stimulus.The more oftenwe encounter a novel subject, the more of its features we shall appreciate;if there is, in addition, an appropriate stimulus (e.g., a pressing need, orsome form of hint), then eventually we shall be able to compare our indi-vidual representations and extricate their common features.In the case 134 The Selfish Memeof the cantilever, the stimulus might simply be a definition, encounteredin a book or conversation.It might, though, take the form of a practi-cal need: if a person is building something, and trying to find a way ofsupporting a structure within it, then this might prompt her to considerthe form of similar structures with which she is already familiar.If sheabstracted from those structures the common, significant feature that itis fixed at one end only, then she could apply it on her own construction,away from its usual context.As another illustration, think of a novice violinist who is able quitecompetently to play several major scales, as well as the arpeggios of C andG major.If she is asked to play the arpeggio of D major, then she will notinitially know what to do.In order to produce it, she will have to thinkabout the arpeggios she knows, in an attempt to ascertain their commonfeatures.Once she has abstracted the rule governing the sequence ofintervals in an arpeggio, she will be able to apply that rule to the newsituation: now she should be able to produce the arpeggio of D major,and indeed of any other key for which she is asked.Clearly, the sorts of concepts that first emerged would not have hadanything like the complexity of arpeggios or cantilevers, but it is notimplausible that they should have been acquired by a process which wasin essence similar to that described.The subject of the concept moved,in other words, from context dependency to abstraction as a result of ourbeing stimulated to compare the common features of various familiarnotions.Thus the key element in the emergence of concepts was the facilityfor internal comparison of representations, without which it is impos-sible to discern their common (functionally relevant) features.A vitalconsequence of this would be the ability to abstract information fromincoming representations as well as from the environment and thisfaculty would have been useful enough for selection to favour those ofour ancestors who were not only able, but also tended to represent andto compare representations.(Indeed, this view is supported by observa-tions of variation in modern humans tendency to make internal mentallinks, and the fact that a bias towards this tendency is a key character-istic of gifted individuals [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.Now, the hominid could not have learned this behavioural pattern inthe first place without the ability to link his representations of how to stripleaves and dip for ants.What he needs now, in order to form a conceptof an ant dipper, is to compare his representations and see what theyhave in common: to form a representation, in other words, of the linkthat he has already made between the two.He needs to recognize thefact that the two activities are linked by the stick (or more accurately itsdipper properties being long, thin, etc.), and in so doing he will free hisrepresentation of that object from its original context as a bridge betweentwo other representations.Indeed, the establishment of a concept will always initially be a com-parative process: we need to be able to compare our notions, in orderto abstract their important common features from the various contexts. Early Cultural Evolution 133This is reminiscent of the fact that an important part of any replicator scontent is determined by the differences between itself and its alleles.Whatwe humans can do is to see those differences, and to form representationsof them and as soon as a creature can compare its representations witheach other, its mental life loses its dependence on the external world.A creature whose representations are tied to a limited range of exter-nal stimuli and actions cannot manipulate those representations in adifferent context from that limited range.A creature whose represen-tations have been freed from those bonds, however, may manipulate itsconcepts quite independently of their original contexts.No longer doits representations depend on external stimulation: representations oflinks between representations can be triggered by the original represen-tations themselves, whether or not the creature finds itself in their usualcontext.Meta-Representation TodayMy claim that the emergence of concepts is always a comparative pro-cess gains credence from a consideration of how meta-representationalconcepts emerge, even today.Few people have any clear recollection ofthe way in which they first grasped concepts such as sheep , tree andother basic elements of our understanding of our surroundings.We can,though, be clearer about our more recent acquisition of more complexconcepts such as cantilever , or harmonic minor scale .They appearto be acquired in two steps: at first the notion will be a peripheral partof a theory or activity, the bulk of which is familiar.The reason why it isperipheral is that our understanding and use of it is wholly context de-pendent.We are not able to speak of that entity outside the circumstancesin which we usually encounter it, for our interaction with it depends onour interaction with its context.As an example, consider the concept ofa cantilever.Many people have seen the Forth Bridge; plenty of womenwear a bra; in most of our houses there are shelves.A cantilever is there-fore a structure familiar to most, yet without some additional stimulusmany people will never acquire its concept (meta-representation).The second step the step that will disentangle the relevant word or en-tity from its usual circumstances will be the combination (in varying pro-portions) of its familiarity, and an appropriate stimulus.The more oftenwe encounter a novel subject, the more of its features we shall appreciate;if there is, in addition, an appropriate stimulus (e.g., a pressing need, orsome form of hint), then eventually we shall be able to compare our indi-vidual representations and extricate their common features.In the case 134 The Selfish Memeof the cantilever, the stimulus might simply be a definition, encounteredin a book or conversation.It might, though, take the form of a practi-cal need: if a person is building something, and trying to find a way ofsupporting a structure within it, then this might prompt her to considerthe form of similar structures with which she is already familiar.If sheabstracted from those structures the common, significant feature that itis fixed at one end only, then she could apply it on her own construction,away from its usual context.As another illustration, think of a novice violinist who is able quitecompetently to play several major scales, as well as the arpeggios of C andG major.If she is asked to play the arpeggio of D major, then she will notinitially know what to do.In order to produce it, she will have to thinkabout the arpeggios she knows, in an attempt to ascertain their commonfeatures.Once she has abstracted the rule governing the sequence ofintervals in an arpeggio, she will be able to apply that rule to the newsituation: now she should be able to produce the arpeggio of D major,and indeed of any other key for which she is asked.Clearly, the sorts of concepts that first emerged would not have hadanything like the complexity of arpeggios or cantilevers, but it is notimplausible that they should have been acquired by a process which wasin essence similar to that described.The subject of the concept moved,in other words, from context dependency to abstraction as a result of ourbeing stimulated to compare the common features of various familiarnotions.Thus the key element in the emergence of concepts was the facilityfor internal comparison of representations, without which it is impos-sible to discern their common (functionally relevant) features.A vitalconsequence of this would be the ability to abstract information fromincoming representations as well as from the environment and thisfaculty would have been useful enough for selection to favour those ofour ancestors who were not only able, but also tended to represent andto compare representations.(Indeed, this view is supported by observa-tions of variation in modern humans tendency to make internal mentallinks, and the fact that a bias towards this tendency is a key character-istic of gifted individuals [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]