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.On this view, one of two outcomes could be better, though it would in-volve a smaller sum of bene`ts, because these bene`ts would be moreequally distributed, or because more of these bene`ts would go to peo-ple who are worse off.In their beliefs about the goodness of outcomes,these consequentialists accept distributive principles.Rawls claims that, if a moral theory includes such principles, it isnot consequentialist.In his words:the problem of distribution falls under the concept of right as one in-tuitively understands it, and so the theory lacks an independent de`-nition of the good.87As we have seen, this may not be true.Reason Consequentialists use good in the impartial reason-involving sense.When these peopleclaim that(2) the rightness of acts depends only on facts about what wouldmake things go best,87TJ, p.25, RE, p.22. 636-p.qxd 4/19/2004 2:00 PM Page 359[Parfit] What We Could Rationally Will 359they mean that(7) the rightness of acts depends only on facts about what everyonehas most reason to want, from an impartial point of view.These people may claim that(6) the goodness of outcomes depends in part on the distribution ofbene`ts and burdens,because they believe that(8) everyone has such impartial reasons to want bene`ts to be moreequally distributed, or to want bene`ts to go to people who areworse off.There is no useful sense in which this view is not consequentialist.14Kant was not a consequentialist.But we are considering, not Kant smoral beliefs, but the implications of his principles.According to Kant sConsent Principle: We ought to treat people only in ways to whichthey could rationally consent.Act Consequentialists can argue:(1) Everyone could rationally consent to being treated in any waythat would make things go best.ThereforeThe Consent Principle never implies that such acts are wrong.This argument s premise, I believe, is true.I believe that in Lifeboat, forexample, White could rationally consent to our leaving her to die, sothat, in the time available, we could save the `ve.If that belief is true,that strongly supports (1).If we could rationally consent to being left todie, when and because that is how things could go best, we could ratio-nally give such consent to having lesser burdens imposed on us.Note that, to accept (1), we need not assume that everyone could 636-p.qxd 4/19/2004 2:00 PM Page 360360 The Tanner Lectures on Human Valuesrationally consent to being treated in any way that would bene`t peoplemost.When such an act would impose a great burden on one person, forthe sake of a greater sum of bene`ts to people who are better off, we maybelieve both that this person could not rationally consent to this act andthat this act would make things go worse.As I have said, consequential-ists can reject utilitarianism.If this argument is sound, as I believe, Kant s Consent Principlecould be accepted by Act Consequentialists.Kant s Contractualist Formula, however, provides one premise of anargument against AC.In the thought-experiments to which this for-mula appeals, each person supposes that she has the power to choosewhich principles we would all accept.We can argue:We ought to act on the principles that everyone could rationallychoose.We could not all rationally choose that everyone accepts the ActConsequentialist principle.ThereforeThis is not the principle on which we ought to act.This argument, I believe, is also sound.Sidgwick concluded that wecould not rationally want it to be true that everyone accepts Act Utili-tarianism.Of Sidgwick s reasons for reaching this conclusion, mostwould apply to Act Consequentialism.If everyone believed that it wasright to do whatever would make things go best, that would be un-likely to make things go best.Things would be likely to go better ifeveryone had certain other moral beliefs.If we knew that to be true,some of us could not rationally choose that everyone accepts Act Conse-quentialism.Kant s Formula would then imply that we should rejectthis view.Return now to Rule Consequentialism.On this view,we ought to act on the principles whose acceptance would makethings go best.This view is very different from Act Consequentialism.Partly for thereasons Sidgwick gave, Rule Consequentialism supports principles thatare much closer to most people s moral beliefs. 636-p.qxd 4/19/2004 2:00 PM Page 361[Parfit] What We Could Rationally Will 361Rule Consequentialists can appeal to Kant s Contractualist Formula.They can argue:(A) We ought to act on the principles whose universal acceptanceeveryone could rationally choose.(B) Everyone could rationally choose whatever they would havesuf`cient reason to choose.(C) Everyone would have suf`cient reason to choose that everyoneaccepts the principles whose acceptance would make things go best.(D) These are the only principles that everyone would have suf`cientreasons to choose.ThereforeThese are the principles on which we ought to act.Premise (A) is Kant s Contractualist Formula.If the other premises aretrue, this formula implies Rule Consequentialism.According to premise (B), everyone could rationally choose whateverthey would have suf`cient reason to choose.That is not always true.What we have reason to choose depends on the facts, but what we canrationally choose depends on our beliefs.If we are ignorant, or have falsebeliefs, it can be rational to choose what we have no reason to choose, orvice versa.So, when we apply Kant s Formula, we should suppose thateveryone knows the relevant facts.We should suppose, in particular, that people have no false beliefsabout reasons.If we have suf`cient reasons to make some choice, but wefalsely believe that we have stronger reasons not to make this choice, wecould not rationally make this choice.It is irrational to choose what webelieve that we have stronger reasons not to choose.For Kant s Formulato be plausible, we must suppose that everyone knows what they havereasons to choose.On that assumption, premise (B) is true.Everyonecould rationally choose whatever, as they know, they have suf`cient rea-son to choose.Kant s Formula appeals to the principles that everyone couldrationally choose, if each person supposed that she could choose whichprinciples everyone would accept.According to premise (C), each per-son would have suf`cient reason to choose the principles whose accept-ance would make things go best. 636-p.qxd 4/19/2004 2:00 PM Page 362362 The Tanner Lectures on Human ValuesSome people would reject (C) because they believe that there is nointelligible sense in which things might go better or worse.But, if thesepeople have the concept of a normative reason, as some of them seem todo, they must understand the claim that some outcomes would be bestin the impartial reason-involving sense.These people might claim thatthere are no such outcomes, since there are no outcomes that everyonehas reasons to want.And this must be claimed by those who accept ei-ther desire-based theories about reasons or the Self-interest Theory.I amassuming, though, that we should reject these theories.We all have rea-sons to want some outcomes, such as those in which fewer people suffer,or die young.And there are some principles whose acceptance would, inthis impartial sense, make things go best or equal-best.We might also challenge (C) by appealing to our nonconsequen-tialist moral beliefs [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.On this view, one of two outcomes could be better, though it would in-volve a smaller sum of bene`ts, because these bene`ts would be moreequally distributed, or because more of these bene`ts would go to peo-ple who are worse off.In their beliefs about the goodness of outcomes,these consequentialists accept distributive principles.Rawls claims that, if a moral theory includes such principles, it isnot consequentialist.In his words:the problem of distribution falls under the concept of right as one in-tuitively understands it, and so the theory lacks an independent de`-nition of the good.87As we have seen, this may not be true.Reason Consequentialists use good in the impartial reason-involving sense.When these peopleclaim that(2) the rightness of acts depends only on facts about what wouldmake things go best,87TJ, p.25, RE, p.22. 636-p.qxd 4/19/2004 2:00 PM Page 359[Parfit] What We Could Rationally Will 359they mean that(7) the rightness of acts depends only on facts about what everyonehas most reason to want, from an impartial point of view.These people may claim that(6) the goodness of outcomes depends in part on the distribution ofbene`ts and burdens,because they believe that(8) everyone has such impartial reasons to want bene`ts to be moreequally distributed, or to want bene`ts to go to people who areworse off.There is no useful sense in which this view is not consequentialist.14Kant was not a consequentialist.But we are considering, not Kant smoral beliefs, but the implications of his principles.According to Kant sConsent Principle: We ought to treat people only in ways to whichthey could rationally consent.Act Consequentialists can argue:(1) Everyone could rationally consent to being treated in any waythat would make things go best.ThereforeThe Consent Principle never implies that such acts are wrong.This argument s premise, I believe, is true.I believe that in Lifeboat, forexample, White could rationally consent to our leaving her to die, sothat, in the time available, we could save the `ve.If that belief is true,that strongly supports (1).If we could rationally consent to being left todie, when and because that is how things could go best, we could ratio-nally give such consent to having lesser burdens imposed on us.Note that, to accept (1), we need not assume that everyone could 636-p.qxd 4/19/2004 2:00 PM Page 360360 The Tanner Lectures on Human Valuesrationally consent to being treated in any way that would bene`t peoplemost.When such an act would impose a great burden on one person, forthe sake of a greater sum of bene`ts to people who are better off, we maybelieve both that this person could not rationally consent to this act andthat this act would make things go worse.As I have said, consequential-ists can reject utilitarianism.If this argument is sound, as I believe, Kant s Consent Principlecould be accepted by Act Consequentialists.Kant s Contractualist Formula, however, provides one premise of anargument against AC.In the thought-experiments to which this for-mula appeals, each person supposes that she has the power to choosewhich principles we would all accept.We can argue:We ought to act on the principles that everyone could rationallychoose.We could not all rationally choose that everyone accepts the ActConsequentialist principle.ThereforeThis is not the principle on which we ought to act.This argument, I believe, is also sound.Sidgwick concluded that wecould not rationally want it to be true that everyone accepts Act Utili-tarianism.Of Sidgwick s reasons for reaching this conclusion, mostwould apply to Act Consequentialism.If everyone believed that it wasright to do whatever would make things go best, that would be un-likely to make things go best.Things would be likely to go better ifeveryone had certain other moral beliefs.If we knew that to be true,some of us could not rationally choose that everyone accepts Act Conse-quentialism.Kant s Formula would then imply that we should rejectthis view.Return now to Rule Consequentialism.On this view,we ought to act on the principles whose acceptance would makethings go best.This view is very different from Act Consequentialism.Partly for thereasons Sidgwick gave, Rule Consequentialism supports principles thatare much closer to most people s moral beliefs. 636-p.qxd 4/19/2004 2:00 PM Page 361[Parfit] What We Could Rationally Will 361Rule Consequentialists can appeal to Kant s Contractualist Formula.They can argue:(A) We ought to act on the principles whose universal acceptanceeveryone could rationally choose.(B) Everyone could rationally choose whatever they would havesuf`cient reason to choose.(C) Everyone would have suf`cient reason to choose that everyoneaccepts the principles whose acceptance would make things go best.(D) These are the only principles that everyone would have suf`cientreasons to choose.ThereforeThese are the principles on which we ought to act.Premise (A) is Kant s Contractualist Formula.If the other premises aretrue, this formula implies Rule Consequentialism.According to premise (B), everyone could rationally choose whateverthey would have suf`cient reason to choose.That is not always true.What we have reason to choose depends on the facts, but what we canrationally choose depends on our beliefs.If we are ignorant, or have falsebeliefs, it can be rational to choose what we have no reason to choose, orvice versa.So, when we apply Kant s Formula, we should suppose thateveryone knows the relevant facts.We should suppose, in particular, that people have no false beliefsabout reasons.If we have suf`cient reasons to make some choice, but wefalsely believe that we have stronger reasons not to make this choice, wecould not rationally make this choice.It is irrational to choose what webelieve that we have stronger reasons not to choose.For Kant s Formulato be plausible, we must suppose that everyone knows what they havereasons to choose.On that assumption, premise (B) is true.Everyonecould rationally choose whatever, as they know, they have suf`cient rea-son to choose.Kant s Formula appeals to the principles that everyone couldrationally choose, if each person supposed that she could choose whichprinciples everyone would accept.According to premise (C), each per-son would have suf`cient reason to choose the principles whose accept-ance would make things go best. 636-p.qxd 4/19/2004 2:00 PM Page 362362 The Tanner Lectures on Human ValuesSome people would reject (C) because they believe that there is nointelligible sense in which things might go better or worse.But, if thesepeople have the concept of a normative reason, as some of them seem todo, they must understand the claim that some outcomes would be bestin the impartial reason-involving sense.These people might claim thatthere are no such outcomes, since there are no outcomes that everyonehas reasons to want.And this must be claimed by those who accept ei-ther desire-based theories about reasons or the Self-interest Theory.I amassuming, though, that we should reject these theories.We all have rea-sons to want some outcomes, such as those in which fewer people suffer,or die young.And there are some principles whose acceptance would, inthis impartial sense, make things go best or equal-best.We might also challenge (C) by appealing to our nonconsequen-tialist moral beliefs [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]