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.28 In their view, we invariably take up a conversational stance that carries significant assumptions whenever weseriously express our views to one another about what there is reason tobelieve and do.Pettit and Smith do not discuss the addressing of second-personal reasons as a special case.It is helpful, therefore, to consider theirdiscussion, both for the light it sheds on the role of reciprocal recognitionin all serious conversation about what to believe and do and to providea contrasting background against which to grasp the distinctive connec-tion between reciprocal recognition and second-personal practical rea-sons. Conversation, Pettit and Smith say, is the means whereby we rec-ognize others and seek recognition from them (1996: 430).In serious conversation of an intellectual kind, people authorize their interlocu-tors and in turn assume authorization by them (430, 432).When theissue is what to believe, both parties presume in common that they areeach authorities worth listening to and that, when they differ, a reviewof the evidence commonly available can usually reveal who is in thewrong and thereby establish agreement (430 431).The point is not thatparticipants in serious common inquiry must believe either that the otherparty is credible or judicious or even sufficiently intellectually competentto be worth engaging in serious discussion.Rather, discussion in earnestmust proceed on the assumption that the other is a competent theoreticalreasoner.Otherwise, a genuine discussion with her about what to believesimply doesn t make sense in its own terms.28.A similar view about the second-personal character of assertion lies behind Dum-mett s views on truth in Dummett 1990.I am indebted here to Rumfitt forthcoming.Copyright © 2009 The President and Fellows of Harvard College 56 The Second-Person Stance and Second-Personal ReasonsSpecifically, Pettit and Smith claim that participants who take up the conversational stance must each assume: (1) that there are norms thatgovern what each should believe, (2) that each can recognize these norms,and (3) that each is capable of guiding her beliefs by them (1996: 433).The point, again, is that mutual reason-giving makes sense in its ownterms only if this is presupposed.It makes sense to engage in a discussionfor the purpose of determining what to believe only if one assumes thatthe other is a competent reasoner and that she accepts and is guided bynorms for belief.Of course, there might be all sorts of extrinsic reasonsfor entering into a conversation that has the appearance of authenticinteractive inquiry that do not require such an assumption.Or one mighttake discussion with another as evidence in some other way (as in, Ialways believe the opposite of what he says ).This is a stronger claim than the general Austinian point about speechacts.An advisor must generally assume, for example, that her advisee issufficiently capable of normative guidance to follow her advice.But thisdoesn t commit her to assuming that he can give advice himself or takepart in a genuinely mutual conversation about what to do.Still, even ifnot all theoretical and practical reason-giving presupposes the reciprocalauthority that serious conversations have as the price of admission, Iargue that addressing distinctively second-personal practical reasons doesinvariably presuppose a common authority that addresser and addresseehave alike as free and rational agents.The holding of this assumption is,I claim, a normative felicity condition of any second-personal addresswhatsoever in the sense that it is a necessary condition of the second-personal reasons actually existing and being given through address.In this section, however, our purpose is to understand the presuppo-sitions of theoretical reason-giving so that we can then contrast these withthose of addressing second-personal reasons.A few words are needed,therefore, about belief.By its very nature, belief is responsible to an in-dependent order of fact, which it aims to represent in a believer-neutralway.Belief is regulated by an independent truth (Shah 2003; Shah andVelleman forthcoming).Unlike, for example, an assumption that p, abelief that p is mistaken when p is false, though an assumed propositionis no less false than a believed one.Of course, what reasons people haveto believe things about the world depend in many ways on where theystand in relation to it.But ultimately their reasons must be grounded insomething that is independent of their stance, namely, what is the caseCopyright © 2009 The President and Fellows of Harvard College The Second-Person Stance and Second-Personal Reasons 57believer-neutrally.Our beliefs are simply the world (including our placein it) as seen (committedly) from our perspective; what we should believedepends ultimately on the world as it actually is.This has important consequences for what we must assume when weaddress reasons for belief to one another.As recent discussions of testi-mony have brought out, there are cases in which doxastic reasons are atleast superficially second-personal (Burge 1993; Coady 1992; Foley 1994;Hinchman 2000; Moran 2005).Someone can give you a reason to believesomething not just by pointing to evidence, but also by simply tellingyou it is so.When you believe something for this reason, you give theperson whose testimony you trust a kind of second-personal authority inyour own reasoning about what to believe.But this authority is notsecond-personal all the way down.It ultimately depends upon and isdefeasible by epistemic authority.If you come to believe that the person stestimony is absolutely unreliable, you will no longer give him second-personal authority in a serious conversation about what to believe.Someone can address reasons for belief, therefore, only if we take himto have some epistemic authority, or, at least, only if we don t take himto have none.Even if we unavoidably make such an assumption, in Dav-idsonian fashion, in interpreting him as minded at all, it is nonethelessthe presumed relation to the facts as they are anyway that, as we mustassume, earns him the standing to give reasons to us.Were we to believehis utterances to be only randomly related to the way things actually are,he could give us no reasons for belief, if indeed we could interpret himas saying anything at all.As I indicated earlier, this contrasts with theauthority to address second-personal practical reasons.Although knowl-edge and wisdom, even about practical affairs, is sometimes a ground forendowing someone with some kinds of second-personal authority overconduct, it is not what such authority consists in.And there are somekinds of second-personal authority, arguably that of persons as such, thatrequire relatively little epistemic authority.Addressing Second-Personal Practical ReasonsPettit and Smith discuss the mutual giving of practical reasons as thoughit were fully analogous to reciprocal theoretical reasoning.Just as con-versants about what to believe mutually recognize norms for belief andtheir competence to be guided by them, along with the standing bothCopyright © 2009 The President and Fellows of Harvard College 58 The Second-Person Stance and Second-Personal Reasonshave to address reasons based in these norms, so likewise, Pettit andSmith argue, do individuals involved in a serious conversation about whatto do commit themselves to analogous assumptions concerning normsfor desire and action, their capacity to guide themselves by these norms,and their standing to give reasons grounded in them [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
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.28 In their view, we invariably take up a conversational stance that carries significant assumptions whenever weseriously express our views to one another about what there is reason tobelieve and do.Pettit and Smith do not discuss the addressing of second-personal reasons as a special case.It is helpful, therefore, to consider theirdiscussion, both for the light it sheds on the role of reciprocal recognitionin all serious conversation about what to believe and do and to providea contrasting background against which to grasp the distinctive connec-tion between reciprocal recognition and second-personal practical rea-sons. Conversation, Pettit and Smith say, is the means whereby we rec-ognize others and seek recognition from them (1996: 430).In serious conversation of an intellectual kind, people authorize their interlocu-tors and in turn assume authorization by them (430, 432).When theissue is what to believe, both parties presume in common that they areeach authorities worth listening to and that, when they differ, a reviewof the evidence commonly available can usually reveal who is in thewrong and thereby establish agreement (430 431).The point is not thatparticipants in serious common inquiry must believe either that the otherparty is credible or judicious or even sufficiently intellectually competentto be worth engaging in serious discussion.Rather, discussion in earnestmust proceed on the assumption that the other is a competent theoreticalreasoner.Otherwise, a genuine discussion with her about what to believesimply doesn t make sense in its own terms.28.A similar view about the second-personal character of assertion lies behind Dum-mett s views on truth in Dummett 1990.I am indebted here to Rumfitt forthcoming.Copyright © 2009 The President and Fellows of Harvard College 56 The Second-Person Stance and Second-Personal ReasonsSpecifically, Pettit and Smith claim that participants who take up the conversational stance must each assume: (1) that there are norms thatgovern what each should believe, (2) that each can recognize these norms,and (3) that each is capable of guiding her beliefs by them (1996: 433).The point, again, is that mutual reason-giving makes sense in its ownterms only if this is presupposed.It makes sense to engage in a discussionfor the purpose of determining what to believe only if one assumes thatthe other is a competent reasoner and that she accepts and is guided bynorms for belief.Of course, there might be all sorts of extrinsic reasonsfor entering into a conversation that has the appearance of authenticinteractive inquiry that do not require such an assumption.Or one mighttake discussion with another as evidence in some other way (as in, Ialways believe the opposite of what he says ).This is a stronger claim than the general Austinian point about speechacts.An advisor must generally assume, for example, that her advisee issufficiently capable of normative guidance to follow her advice.But thisdoesn t commit her to assuming that he can give advice himself or takepart in a genuinely mutual conversation about what to do.Still, even ifnot all theoretical and practical reason-giving presupposes the reciprocalauthority that serious conversations have as the price of admission, Iargue that addressing distinctively second-personal practical reasons doesinvariably presuppose a common authority that addresser and addresseehave alike as free and rational agents.The holding of this assumption is,I claim, a normative felicity condition of any second-personal addresswhatsoever in the sense that it is a necessary condition of the second-personal reasons actually existing and being given through address.In this section, however, our purpose is to understand the presuppo-sitions of theoretical reason-giving so that we can then contrast these withthose of addressing second-personal reasons.A few words are needed,therefore, about belief.By its very nature, belief is responsible to an in-dependent order of fact, which it aims to represent in a believer-neutralway.Belief is regulated by an independent truth (Shah 2003; Shah andVelleman forthcoming).Unlike, for example, an assumption that p, abelief that p is mistaken when p is false, though an assumed propositionis no less false than a believed one.Of course, what reasons people haveto believe things about the world depend in many ways on where theystand in relation to it.But ultimately their reasons must be grounded insomething that is independent of their stance, namely, what is the caseCopyright © 2009 The President and Fellows of Harvard College The Second-Person Stance and Second-Personal Reasons 57believer-neutrally.Our beliefs are simply the world (including our placein it) as seen (committedly) from our perspective; what we should believedepends ultimately on the world as it actually is.This has important consequences for what we must assume when weaddress reasons for belief to one another.As recent discussions of testi-mony have brought out, there are cases in which doxastic reasons are atleast superficially second-personal (Burge 1993; Coady 1992; Foley 1994;Hinchman 2000; Moran 2005).Someone can give you a reason to believesomething not just by pointing to evidence, but also by simply tellingyou it is so.When you believe something for this reason, you give theperson whose testimony you trust a kind of second-personal authority inyour own reasoning about what to believe.But this authority is notsecond-personal all the way down.It ultimately depends upon and isdefeasible by epistemic authority.If you come to believe that the person stestimony is absolutely unreliable, you will no longer give him second-personal authority in a serious conversation about what to believe.Someone can address reasons for belief, therefore, only if we take himto have some epistemic authority, or, at least, only if we don t take himto have none.Even if we unavoidably make such an assumption, in Dav-idsonian fashion, in interpreting him as minded at all, it is nonethelessthe presumed relation to the facts as they are anyway that, as we mustassume, earns him the standing to give reasons to us.Were we to believehis utterances to be only randomly related to the way things actually are,he could give us no reasons for belief, if indeed we could interpret himas saying anything at all.As I indicated earlier, this contrasts with theauthority to address second-personal practical reasons.Although knowl-edge and wisdom, even about practical affairs, is sometimes a ground forendowing someone with some kinds of second-personal authority overconduct, it is not what such authority consists in.And there are somekinds of second-personal authority, arguably that of persons as such, thatrequire relatively little epistemic authority.Addressing Second-Personal Practical ReasonsPettit and Smith discuss the mutual giving of practical reasons as thoughit were fully analogous to reciprocal theoretical reasoning.Just as con-versants about what to believe mutually recognize norms for belief andtheir competence to be guided by them, along with the standing bothCopyright © 2009 The President and Fellows of Harvard College 58 The Second-Person Stance and Second-Personal Reasonshave to address reasons based in these norms, so likewise, Pettit andSmith argue, do individuals involved in a serious conversation about whatto do commit themselves to analogous assumptions concerning normsfor desire and action, their capacity to guide themselves by these norms,and their standing to give reasons grounded in them [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]